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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents an analysis of United States (U.S.) foreign policy in Egypt during the 
rule of Hosni Mubarak.  It examines the role of U.S. foreign aid and the policy of 
extraordinary rendition in the perpetuation of Mubarak’s authoritarian regime.  The 
research relates the negative externalities associated with these policies to radicalization 
theory and illustrates how U.S. foreign policy impacts homeland security.  
Complementary to this discussion, the thesis examines the nature of political Islam in 
order to challenge the perspective that it is an ideological rival of democracy and to 
illustrate its role as a stabilizing force in Middle Eastern governments and U.S. national 
security.  Lastly, the research reveals the imbalance of power in the U.S. government 
contributing to foreign policy that is inconsonant with the proliferation of democracy and 
the promotion of human rights. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the role of United States (U.S.) foreign policy in Egypt after 
Hosni Mubarak took office in 1981.  Egypt’s autocracy provided international stability by 
supporting a peace with Israel and allowing the United States access to the Suez Canal 
and airspace permitting transit to the Arabian Peninsula.  However, it also stifled Islamic 
opposition groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and militants have cited its policies as 
motivation for terrorist attacks. U.S. foreign policy supporting autocratic rulers of Arab 
states impacts homeland security because these rulers’ marginalization of Islamic 
political parties can foster extremism, increase the threat of terrorism to the U.S., and lead 
to catastrophic political instability that results in a takeover of the country by a regime 
that supports hostility towards the United States. The research will identify how U.S. 
policy in Egypt affected reform towards a democratic state before Mubarak’s resignation 
in the spring of 2011.  The thesis examines U.S. foreign aid and security policy in 
relation to Egyptian democratic reform and human rights records.  Additionally, it 
explores political Islam and its relevance to U.S. foreign policy.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
1. The U.S.’s Role in the Middle East  
The objective of U.S. policy in the Middle East over the past half-century has 
been to maintain stability in order to ensure access to the region’s oil and the containment 
of rival powers.  Despite America’s promotion of democracy, especially after the fall of 
the Soviet Union, it has routinely supported un-democratic Middle Eastern regimes in 
pursuit of national interests.  U.S. support for these regime types has been one of the 
rationales for terrorist groups to increase attacks against America and its interests 
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beginning in the 1990s.1  The end of the Cold War, coupled with the Egyptian 
demonstration of the peoples’ power to reform, presents a potential point of departure 
from backing regimes that do not support democratic principles for the United States.  
Opponents of such actions argue that the U.S. cannot afford to risk instability in the 
region that fuels the world economy and that a gradual approach that does not challenge 
the status quo must ensue in order to maintain stability along the path to democracy in the 
Middle East. 
2. The Middle East’s Role in the U.S. 
The Middle East is the most important geographical region of the world today.  
The U.S. is dependent on its natural resources, partnership in combating terrorism, and 
cooperation in garnering peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Each of these factors 
contributes to the security threat that instability in the Middle East presents to the U.S. 
The U.S. economy is dependent on the flow of Middle Eastern oil.  Business’ 
fabrication of products and their transportation to market rely on the Middle East’s 
contribution to the energy market and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) price regulations.  The impact of a reduction in oil supply or price hikes could 
cause serious damage to both the U.S. and global economies and impact homeland 
security by restricting the U.S.’s ability to provide for its (and others’) defense. 
The U.S. military and the nation’s security are dependent on Middle East oil.  
Without the region’s supply of this natural resource the global reach and day-to-day 
operations of the various branches of the U.S. military would grind to a halt.  Therefore, 
it is in the U.S. national interest to support stability in the Middle East in order to enable 
military operations that support Homeland Security and Defense such as counter-
terrorism actions abroad and Operation Noble Eagle flights at home.   
                                                 
1 Osama bin Laden, “Speech to the American People,” in Richard K. Betts, ed., Conflict After the Cold 
War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 541. Michael 
Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 
2004), xviii. 
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However, recent U.S. stability measures have resulted in U.S. support for UN-democratic 
regimes such as Egypt, Libya, and Saudi Arabia and have caused dissent in some groups 
that subscribe to terrorist tactics.   
The dichotomy between the U.S. desire for democracy in the Middle East and the 
maintenance of the region’s stability presents a problem for policy makers.  Policies that 
support the status quo—stability provided by the current regime regardless of the level of 
oppression—may manifest instability in fringe extremist groups and lead to increased 
terrorism against the U.S.  On the other hand, accepting higher levels of political 
participation in states may result in more sustainable stability that does not rely on 
coercion in the long run, even though it may provide extremist groups a voice in politics.  
The tension between these two approaches to foreign policy presents one of the most 
pressing decision points for policy makers today.  Optimally, U.S. policy in the Middle 
East should foster reform that encourages democratic principles while discouraging and 
discrediting terrorism. 
One major factor contributing to Middle East instability is the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  While there is consensus that this dispute must be solved prior to peace reigning 
in the Middle East, it does not represent an immediate threat to U.S. security when 
compared to aforementioned concerns.  This topic deserves further research but is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis examines the conditions under which the United States worked with 
the Mubarak regime and this arrangement’s impact on U.S. homeland security.  Major 
turning points in the country’s modern history occurred with the Camp David Accords, 
the end of the Cold War, and, most recently, the Arab Spring.  Despite changing 
international conditions, Egypt’s government has not experienced a transition away from 
the authoritarian status quo or a change in U.S. policy towards the state.  Lessons from 
the past three decades in Egypt are important factors that U.S. policymakers must 
consider when weighing foreign policy options with other Arab authoritarian regimes.  
Analysis of how U.S. foreign policy either encouraged or inhibited reform in Egypt may 
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provide the key to dismantling the glut of authoritarianism in other Arab countries and 
improving U.S. homeland security by fostering stability and accountability in these states.  
The research should identify U.S. policy options that promote stability without 
compromising democratic principles by examining the historical record.  By determining 
how policies affect democratic reform and interact with political Islam, the U.S. may 
improve homeland security by encouraging more transparent societies and eliminating 
the breeding grounds produced by the marginalization of groups that resort to extremism 
and carry out terrorist attacks. 
1. Egyptian Stability 
The recent events in Egypt unveiled the region’s ability to enact political change 
from below. Hosni Mubarak’s resignation occurred despite the U.S. alliance with his 
regime and defied the odds of a successful popular movement against a military 
dictatorship.  Historically, the U.S. has discounted the Arab people’s desire and capability 
to stand up to autocratic regimes in some Middle East countries and has shied away from 
supporting popular movements.  Egypt has entered into a new phase of instability due to 
the fall of its autocracy and this presents threats to U.S. interests in the Suez Canal and 
counter-terrorism efforts. 
The U.S. relies on stability in the Middle East to maintain economic, military, and 
political interests in order to ensure homeland security.  This stability ensures access to 
the region’s natural resources, provides the U.S. the ability to deter adversaries such as 
Iran or Al Qaeda, and reduces the need to intervene in the fragile Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Middle East instability constitutes an existential threat to multiple nations in the region 
and has the potential to produce catastrophic effects on U.S. security as a result of 
economic malaise and the threat of terrorism. 
The historical U.S. modus operandi was to maintain stability by providing support 
for friendly regimes that hold power, regardless of the nature of governance.  Such policy 
involved the requirement to support regimes that did not champion the U.S. concepts of 
liberty, such as Mubarak’s autocratic government.  In lieu of a policy that entails 
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supporting autocratic or dictatorial regimes, the alternative method to foster stability 
requires significant social, economic, and political reform to occur in Middle East states. 
2. Challenging the Status Quo 
Attempts by foreign countries to enact reform on sovereign states from without 
have met with limited success.  Previous to the Arab Spring, reform in the Middle East 
was stifled by the autocratic policies of most regimes that were abetted by the U.S.’s 
compliance with these regimes’ policies.  The Egyptian uprising of 2011 provides an 
alternative to the status quo. 
U.S. foreign policy spans a wide spectrum of bureaucratic governance that leaves 
room for the existence of counterproductive initiatives.  It is critical that academics and 
policymakers take the time to recognize when policy counteracts strategy in order to 
achieve democratic objectives in the future.  At a time when many scholars and 
politicians describe America’s position in the world as declining, research must analyze if 
foreign policy helped hasten these beliefs. 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that U.S. support for the Mubarak regime and the 
policy of extraordinary rendition delegitimized the U.S. democratic message, quelled 
Egyptian reform efforts, and ostracized political Islam.  As a result, U.S. homeland 
security has suffered due to Egyptian discontent with the autocratic regime and its U.S. 
patron state.  The United States must refocus its foreign policy on long term stability by 
ensuring its actions adhere to democratic ideals and helping liberalize political 
participation in order to delegitimize radical groups. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Egyptian Authoritarianism 
The current literature on Egypt under Mubarak describes a political system 
retreating from democracy.  The economic reform strategy Mubarak used prior to 1990 
and the multiparty political system was inherited from Sadat.2  Additionally, Mubarak 
                                                 
2 Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004), 26. 
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prioritized economic reform over democratic advances because he believed a reversal of 
prioritization would lead to instability.3 This leads to an ongoing debate in Arab 
democratic reform that revolves around the two camps that cannot agree on whether 
economic liberalization is required prior to democratization taking place.4 
According to Maye Kassem, democratization in Egypt eroded after 1990 when 
elections began to result in fewer opposition groups winning parliamentary seats and the 
executive dominated legislative actions.5  The regime upheld the law on the state of 
emergency, posing barriers to a free press, freedom of expression, and freedom of 
assembly.  Additionally, this measure gave authorization for the president to try civilians 
in military courts, undermining the judiciary and providing the ability to stifle 
opposition.6 
Egypt under Mubarak experienced a significant expansion in civil society and 
nongovernmental organizations; however, these gains did not reverse the retreat from 
democracy.  The lack of a “balance of power” in government and the executive’s lack of 
respect for civil rights undermined superficial democratic overtures such as multiparty 
elections, which were manipulated by Mubarak’s party.7  The Economist Intelligence 
Unit ranked Egypt’s level of democracy at 138th in the world for 2010 and illustrated a 
continuing decline with a democracy index that decayed from 3.89 to 3.07 between 2008 
and 2010.8 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 27. 
4 Kenneth M. Pollack, A Path Out of the Desert (New York: Random House, 2008), 254, 279.  Steven 
A. Cook, “The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 84, No. 2 (Mar/Apr 2005), 93-
94. Crispin Hawes, “Change in the Middle East: Why Governance Counts,” Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, The OECD Observer (May 2005), 34. Amr Elshobaki and Gema Martin 
Munoz, Why Europe must engage with political Islam (Condé-sur-Noireau, France: EU Institute for 
Security Studies and European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2010), 27, 33.  Hilton L. Root, Yan Li, and 
Kanishka Balasuriya, “The U.S. foreign aid policy to the Middle East,” in Robert E. Looney, ed., 
Handbook of U.S.-Middle East Relations: Formative Factors and Regional Perspectives (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 49. 
5 Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule, 29-30. 
6 Ibid., 37. 
7 Ibid., 186. 
8 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat,” The Economist, 2010, 
www.eiu.com/democracy (accessed May 22, 2011), 13. 
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Historians attribute the centralization of power in Arab countries to the legacy of 
colonialism, the struggle to evict imperialism, a dependency on the military apparatus, 
and poor economic development.9  The decolonization period produced the Arab nation-
state and, in the case of Egypt, a small group of individuals called the Free Officers were 
ultimately responsible for the country’s independence.  The leader of the movement, 
Gamal Nasser, took on the role of Egypt’s savior and utilized “protectionist and 
distributive socio-economic models” to fulfill a patriarchal role for the citizenry.10  This 
model was very effective during the age of pan-Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism in 
the 1960s.  According to Gema Martin Munoz, the bifurcation of the value systems of 
civil society and the leadership in the 1970s, especially under the stress of the Arab-
Israeli wars and economic turmoil, caused the Egyptian regime to favor coercion over 
social programs to maintain power.11 
According to Robert Springborg, “Postcolonial Arab governments have been 
weak because they are essentially unconnected to the societies over which they 
preside.”12  This exacerbates the stress of economic turmoil and leads to further coercive 
measures on the regime’s part.  Egypt’s military apparatus experienced a resurgence 
under Mubarak after Sadat’s reduction in its preeminence.13 Mubarak also relied on the 
Central Security Force, which carried out the majority of his coercive policies.14 
Research must examine the relation between U.S. policy and Egypt’s development of its 
coercive apparatus. 
Literature pre-dating the Arab Spring outlined different assessments of 
authoritarianism’s grip in the Arab world.  Scholars such as John Entelis and Kenneth 
Pollack have stated that authoritarianism is not close to ending in Arab countries and that 
                                                 
9 Stephen Zunes, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Limits of U.S. Support,” Global Dialogue Vol. 
8 (Summer 2006), 23. 
10 Elshobaki and Munoz, Why Europe must engage with political Islam, 22. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Robert Springborg, “State-Society Relations in Egypt: The Debate over Owner-Tenant Relations,”  
Middle East Journal, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Spring 1991), 232. 
13 Robert Springborg, “The President and the Field Marshal: Civil-Military Relations in Egypt 
Today,” MERIP Middle East Report, No. 147, (Jul-Aug 1987), 5. 
14 Ibid., 7. 
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the Middle East “cannot stabilize itself and if left to its own devices will wreak havoc on 
the United States and the rest of the world.”15 According to Daniel Brumberg, Egypt’s 
attempts to liberalize institutions have been a feint to help avoid democratization and 
strengthen the autocracy.16  Springborg goes further to hypothesize that Egypt has been 
an enemy of capitalism and open governance as illustrated by its commitment to 
maintaining rentier policies.17 Egypt’s failure to develop a strong middle class after 
Sadat’s open economic policies was a result of the fact that the requisite condition that 
economic growth must outpace population growth for the bourgeoisie to flourish did not 
occur.18  Additionally, in order to counter its weakness relative to society the state 
intentionally limited middle class development, empowered those classes that supported 
the regime, and attempted to keep all societal components fragmented to limit the power 
of opposition movements.19  Analysis of the U.S.’s role in supporting the perpetuation of 
Egyptian authoritarianism must provide further insight on its historical staying power.  
Pollack explains the concept of “Arab exceptionalism” by pointing out that the 
U.S.’s failure to consider other nation’s interests in policymaking leads to a lack of U.S. 
effort “to promote democracy” and hinders the region’s political advance.  Despite the 
country’s poor track record on democratization in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, 
Egypt was second only to Israel as a beneficiary of U.S. assistance, a fact that portrayed 
the U.S. as a supporter of the Mubarak regime.20  During this period the regime 
attempted to restrict foreign democracy promotion by opposing “foreign support to 
independent civic groups.”21  
                                                 
15 John P. Entelis, “The Democratic Imperative vs. the Authoritarian Impulse: The Maghreb State 
between Transition and Terrorism,” Strategic Insights 4 (Jun 2005), 14. 
16 Daniel Brumberg, Democratization Versus Liberalization in the Arab World: Dilemmas and 
Challenges for U.S. Foreign Policy (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005), 1. 
17 Robert Springborg, “Agrarian Bourgeoisie, Semiproletarians, and the Egyptian State: Lessions for 
Liberalization,” International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 22, No. 4 (Nov 1990), 447. 
18 Ibid., 448. 
19 Ibid., 467. 
20 Jeremy M. Sharp, “Egypt in Transition,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 
RL33003 Washington, DC, 4 May 2011, 5. 
21 Ibid., 6. 
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2. U.S. Relations with Egypt 
U.S. foreign policy in Egypt illustrates tension that has attracted scholarly debate. 
U.S. administrations have cooperated with unaccountable autocrats like Mubarak in order 
to suppress Islamic opposition without facing the obstacles presented by democratic 
society.  However, scholars point out that such measures can foster extremism by forcing 
groups to operate outside the rule of law.22  Observers have debated over the utility of 
partnerships with autocratic rulers versus democratic reform when attempting to create 
stability in the Arab world.  The former forces opposition underground while the latter 
may result in radical groups taking over government.23 
Up until the Arab Spring of 2011, the U.S. had embraced a policy of supporting 
friendly autocratic regimes such as Egypt while berating hostile ones.24  Realist observers 
describe U.S. actions as being in line with protecting energy supplies and homeland 
security.25  However, critics highlight the vulnerability of these regimes and the threat to 
American interests if an anti-U.S. group successfully overthrows the ruler of a major oil 
exporter or a country that controls trade routes such as the Suez Canal.  One indicator of 
current U.S. policy is the leadership’s choice not to recognize certain election results in 
Arab states attempting democratic reform if they are counter to U.S. interests.26 
Some scholars have claimed that there is an “alliance curse” that is defined by a 
“perverse relationship between U.S. assistance and autocratic control.”27  Foreign 
assistance allows leaders to resolve internal conflicts through coercion (without fear of 
sanctions) or small-scale liberalization measures.28  Interventionists discount the alliance 
curse and contend that the U.S. must have a foothold in Arab states to enable any hope of 
                                                 
22 Zunes, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Limits of U.S. Support,” 29. 
23 Ibid.  John L. Esposito, “Its’ the Policy Stupid: Political Islam and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Harvard 
International Review, May 2, 2007, http://hir.harvard.edu/its-the-policy-stupid (accessed Nov 28 , 2011). 
24 Zunes, 22.  Cook, “The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform,” 31. 
25 Root, “The U.S. foreign aid policy to the Middle East,” 45. 
26 Elshobaki and Munoz, Why Europe must engage with political Islam, 26. 
27 Root, 38. 
28 Ibid. 
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reform.29 A third perspective favors a lesser role for the U.S. and the adoption of a 
multinational effort to democratize Arab states.30  Those observers that call for a smaller 
U.S. role in democracy promotion point out that the Middle East has grown wary of the 
selective U.S. policy for supporting democracy.31  
3. Egypt and Democratic Reform 
Strategies for fostering democracy in the Middle East take varying positions on 
economic and political prescriptions.  Many observers favor increased financial aid to the 
Middle East in order to encourage economic liberalization and a gradual shift to 
democracy.32  Increased aid on a conditional basis may provide the best opportunity for 
stability and can expand “economic power beyond the autocratic center” through the 
incorporation of free trade and capital markets.33 The level of corruption inherent in Arab 
governments hinders the effects of economic aid and liberalization in autocratic regimes 
and de-emphasizes the need for social and political development.34  Currently, the 
Obama administration, along with the other members of the G8, is providing economic 
assistance to “post-autocratic Arab countries that have toppled heads of state and moved 
towards democracy.”35 
Another source of tension in the debate over democratization in Arab countries is 
the role of political Islam.  Many Americans believe this is the greatest threat to both the 
Middle East and the world.36  However, the opposing camp believes not only that 
                                                 
29 Entelis, “The Democratic Imperative vs. the Authoritarian Impulse: The Maghreb State between 
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33 Hawes, “Change in the Middle East: Why Governance Counts,” 1.  Cook, 4.  Elshobaki and Munoz, 
27, 33.  Root, 49. 
34 Cook, 2.  Elshobaki and Munoz, 27, 33.  Root, 49. 
35 “G8 commits $20bn to ‘Arab Spring’,” Aljazeera, May 27, 2011, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2011/05/201152784050139238.html (accessed 27 May 2011). 
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political Islam is crucial to democratic reform but also that not including it creates an 
extremist threat to America.37  Scholars refrain from portraying political Islam as an 
equal contributor to instability in the Middle East compared to poverty, lack of human 
rights, and unemployment.38  Additionally, some claim that political Islam is better as an 
involved, accountable entity rather than an external power.39  The Muslim Brotherhood, 
“Egypt’s oldest and largest Islamist organization,” has played a significant role in the 
overthrow of Mubarak’s regime and brings the topic of political Islam to the forefront of 
any discussion of democratization in the country.40 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses a historical comparison of the political and security policies of the 
Egyptian and U.S. governments since Mubarak took office by examining scholarly 
articles and books.  Research on current developments will use the aforementioned 
resources along with Congressional Research Service reports, reputable journalistic 
sources, and media reports to examine recent events.  Comparative analysis of political 
and security measures taken by the Mubarak regime, along with U.S. foreign policy 
initiatives in Egypt, between the period of 1981–2011 will constitute the scope of the 
thesis. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of five chapters.  Chapter I has reviewed the current literature 
on reform and U.S. policy in the Middle East.  Chapter II examines the role U.S. foreign 
aid has played in Egyptian democratic reform.  Chapter III analyzes how the U.S. policy 
of extraordinary rendition to Egypt compares to the democratic principle of the rule of 
law.  Chapter IV evaluates how U.S. policy interacts with political Islam.  Lastly, Chapter 
                                                 
37 Elshobaki and Munoz, Why Europe must engage with political Islam, 6.  Zunes, “Democracy and 
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38 Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2011: State of Human Rights in the Middle 
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 12 
V compares U.S. policy with policymakers’ desire for democratic reform and provides 
suggestions for adjusting foreign policy in Egypt in order to improve homeland security. 
Scholars will be correct to characterize the scope of this thesis as reductionist.  
There are many topics involved in international relations and, for each of these variables, 
there are multiple angles from which researchers can approach them.  This thesis 
intentionally limits the examination to two types of U.S. foreign policy with the intent to 
illustrate their impact on homeland security.  Due to the limited nature of the research’s 
scope, the objective of this compilation is to provide an input to the debate over foreign 
policy versus attempting to provide the answer to the deliberation. 
 13 
II. U.S. FOREIGN AID AND EGYPTIAN DOMESTIC POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States established itself as a leader in foreign aid when it implemented 
the Marshall Plan at the end of World War II.  Since then, American rhetoric toward 
developing nations has touted democratization and the development of capitalist systems 
while using food, economic, and military aid programs to bolster relationships.  Egypt 
became the second highest recipient of U.S. aid after Anwar Sadat signed the Camp 
David Accords and established peace with Israel.  Given Egypt’s recent ouster of Hosni 
Mubarak after 30 years in power it is prudent to examine the effects of U.S. policy during 
his reign.  Specifically: Did U.S. policy support the perpetuation of the regime or the 
transition to democracy in Egypt during the past three decades?41 
The trajectory of U.S. policy in Egypt is critical to the democratic message of the 
United States.  If American leaders promote democracy while supporting authoritarian 
leaders their inconsonant actions delegitimize the democratic philosophy.  The 
perpetuation of repressive regimes that limit freedoms undermines long-term stability and 
creates a continuous succession of economic and political stumbling blocks in the path of 
successful democratic reform. 
The United States has used foreign aid to Egypt as a means to secure its own 
interests.  The dichotomy between the U.S. desire for stability, along with financial 
markets, and its promotion of democracy has produced contradictory messages in the 
Middle East.  Of significant import, U.S. support for the Egyptian autocracy through 
foreign aid programs has tarnished the image of democracy.  The fact that Mubarak 
resigned one day after U.S. president Barack Obama called for him to step down 
illustrates the influence of U.S. pressure in Egypt.  Although a plethora of factors could 
have contributed to this event, the impact of the U.S. president’s words illustrates U.S. 
foreign policy’s sway in Egypt’s domestic politics. The U.S. has possessed clout with 
                                                 
41 It is possible to argue that the regime and democratization were not diametrically opposed.  This 
research attempts to show that, although his regime did implement some reform measures, Mubarak did not 
support democracy. 
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Egypt’s leaders since the 1970s and its failure to effectively use leverage via aid may 
have created political and economic ramifications that fomented the rise of groups in 
opposition to the regime and the United States. 
This chapter analyzes the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and Egyptian 
domestic policy.  In order to do this, it is divided into sections that build off of one 
another.  The topics cover the purpose of foreign aid, types of foreign aid, and U.S. aid to 
Egypt relative to reform efforts.  Each section introduces the relevant literature on the 
subject and compares U.S. foreign aid strategy to prevailing thought.  Ultimately, the 
chapter attempts to illustrate how the United States’ focus on short-term goals and U.S. 
interests in Egypt has reduced the long-term security of the United States. 
B. WHY GIVE FOREIGN AID? 
Hans Morgenthau describes two different perspectives on foreign aid: first, that it 
is an obligation of the rich nations and, in opposition to that position, that there is no 
reason for it at all.42  In contrast to the claim of the latter, foreign aid can increase the 
donor state’s power.  Denis Sullivan supports this perspective by pointing out that politics 
play a key role in aid, which can be used to pursue realist policies since it provides a 
leveraging tool for achieving national interests.43 
Two camps exist regarding the purpose of foreign policy.  Liberal internationalists 
promote the concept of democratic values first while realists champion the cause of the 
national interest.44  Political realism views foreign aid as a means to increase national 
power (for example, through alliances).  On the other hand, liberal internationalists 
promote foreign aid as a means to enhance another country’s development.45  The two 
theories overlap when a recipient nation becomes a source of power for a donor (i.e. 
                                                 
42 Hans Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” The American Political Science Review 
Vol. 56, No. 2 (Jun 1962), 301. 
43 Denis J. Sullivan, “The Failure of Foreign Aid: An Examination of Causes and a Call for Reform,” 
Global Governanace Vol. 2, No. 3 (Sep-Dec 1996), 408. 
44 Jeremy M. Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent 
Trends, and the FY2011 Request,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL32260 
Washington, DC, 15 June 2010, 15. 
45 Tomohisa Hattori, “Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid,” Review of International Political Economy 
Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winger 2001), 643. 
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through new economic markets or alliances) as a result of its development.  Based on this 
intersection, foreign aid is ultimately a mechanism for advancing political interests. 
Modernization theory and liberal internationalist thought converge since the latter 
proposes that aid helps underdeveloped countries achieve an accelerated rate of 
advancement that they could not garner on their own.46  On the other hand, foreign aid 
may work to the advantage of the donor by providing new markets or the capability to 
manipulate their own markets by gifting surpluses.47  Chirot goes so far as to argue that 
the market for surplus via foreign aid in imperial relationships can be reciprocal.  That is, 
imperial powers aid colonies by absorbing their surplus—in a free market of coequal 
states where aid is not being given comparative advantage drives similar effects on 
surpluses.48  World system theory puts a negative light on this relationship by asserting 
that foreign aid and the push for economic development and free trade create the 
opportunity for stronger nations to increase their monopoly over developing nations due 
to their more competitive economies.49  Regardless of the angle from which one views 
foreign aid, nations that give aid can use their position to benefit economically in addition 
to politically. 
1. Realism and U.S. Foreign Aid 1954–1991 
U.S. foreign aid to Egypt has historically been provided in pursuit of the national 
interest.  During the Cold War the United States strove to gain influence in Egypt as a 
hedge against the Soviet Union.  The Food for Peace program (P.L. 480) provided 
surplus U.S. wheat to Egypt and helped manage excess supply.  According to the 
Congressional Research Service, “Offers of additional economic aid failed to convince 
Egypt to abandon a parallel relationship with the Soviet Union.”50  The U.S. failure to 
                                                 
46 Daniel Chirot and Thomas D. Hall, “World-System Theory,” Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 8 
(1982), 83. 
47 Peter Uvin, “Regime, Surplus, and Self-Interest: The international Politics of Food Aid,” 
International Studies Quarterly Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep 1992), 297. 
48 Chirot and Hall, 83. 
49 Ibid., 84. 
50 Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the 
FY2011 Request,” 22. 
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achieve its national interest of creating a closer relationship with Egypt was punctuated 
when Egypt severed ties with the U.S. during its war with Israel in 1967.51 Leading up to 
this, the United States had begun reducing aid due to Egypt’s increasing recalcitrance. 
During the 1960s, Congress raised concerns over Egypt’s’ lack of acquiescence to 
U.S. demands despite the aid it received.52  Nasser’s military action in North Yemen, a 
number of hostile actions against American interests in Egypt, and the regime’s refusal to 
acknowledge the role of P.L. 480 in its domestic politics drove the Johnson 
Administration to withhold food aid in late 1964 and early 1965.53  Egypt countered the 
U.S. pressure by rejecting any aid and, therefore, rejecting the relationship when Nasser 
told the U.S. ambassador, “We have been patient with all of the pressure you have 
applied to us with your aid program, but our patience has run out.”54 This would be the 
last time the United States attempted to withhold aid in order to produce desired results.  
Despite its early failure to further national interests via foreign aid to Egypt under Nasser, 
the United States would resume efforts after Sadat took power. 
Anwar Sadat turned to the United States when he became saddled with war debt 
after 1973.  The United States seized this opportunity to reassert its cold war courtship of 
Egypt and advance its objective of supporting an Israeli-Arab peace.  America granted 
economic aid for Egypt’s disengagement with Israel in the Sinai Peninsula in 1975 
followed by yearly stipends of $1.3 billion after Egypt signed the Camp David Accords.  
Prior to and throughout Mubarak’s rule the United States implemented an aid structure 
for Egypt based on its need to maintain stability in a region that included its ally Israel, 
access to natural resources, and potential financial markets. 
According to U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), foreign aid to 
Egypt is intended to “promote peace and regional stability, counter extremism and 
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terrorism, and create an environment conducive to economic reforms.”55  The 2010 
National Security Strategy (NSS) states, “The United States supports the expansion of 
democracy and human rights abroad because governments that respect these values are 
more just, peaceful and legitimate.”56  According to these statements, USAID prioritizes 
stability over reform while the NSS clearly elucidates that stability is the primary 
objective, preferably via democracy and human rights.  The realist approach of U.S. 
foreign aid to Egypt has roots prior to Mubarak.  According to Henry Kissinger, the most 
significant shift in U.S. foreign policy away from the liberal internationalist Wilsonian 
ideology and towards a realist agenda occurred during the Nixon administration.  Nixon 
“perceived the world as composed of ambiguous challenges, of nations impelled by 
interest rather than goodwill, and of incremental rather than final changes.”57  As a result, 
foreign policy focused on stability or “staying power as much as to salvation.”58  
Through his successful engagement with the Soviet Union and China, Nixon set the 
course for a realist of foreign aid dominated by realist thought. 
2. Realism and U.S. Foreign Aid 1991–2011 
U.S. aid to Egypt focused on maintaining American power in the region and has 
remained steady at close to $2 billion annually since 1979.59  During Mubarak’s regime 
this aid was augmented multiple times in order to further U.S. interests.  In 1991, the 
United States cancelled $6.7 billion in Egyptian military debt in return for Mubarak’s aid 
in the Gulf War, specifically for his help in courting an Arab coalition that was critical 
for U.S. legitimacy when opposing Iraq.60  After the events of September 11, 2001 
(9/11), the United States provided an additional $100 million in aid to Egypt in order to 
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help counter the economic impact of the attacks.  Furthermore, as Egypt took on a more 
significant role in the war on terror (one element of which Chapter III will cover) the 
United States helped raise a multilateral aid package of $10 billion for the nation in 
February 2003.61  When research juxtaposes the resilience of U.S. aid efforts to Egypt 
against the regime’s lack of reform on human rights matters as well as democracy, it 
illustrates that U.S. foreign aid objectives prioritized national interests above Egyptian 
development.  Prior to examining Egyptian reform efforts it is crucial to analyze the types 
of foreign aid the United States provided Egypt over the past 30 years. 
C. TYPES OF FOREIGN AID 
Examining the types of aid a nation provides may divulge the political interest of 
the donor state.  Foreign aid consists of humanitarian, subsistence, military, and prestige 
aid, along with bribery and aid for economic development. According to Morgenthau, 
humanitarian aid is the only type of aid that is nonpolitical.62 Subsistence aid provides an 
artificial foundation for “nonviable regimes” to prevail despite the existence of a 
“political alternative.”63  Historically, this type of aid goes to these regimes because the 
donor has an economic or military interest in the region.64  Military aid has typically 
served to increase a nation’s power through alliances.  In the Twentieth Century, this type 
of aid has included prestige aid, where a nation’s stature is elevated based on its receipt 
of state of the art equipment.  Additionally, military aid may act as a bribe to nations by 
leveraging physical security for specific political action (or inaction).65   
Morgenthau defines bribery as the exchange of money and services for political 
service.  Leaders may disguise this concept with the moniker of “foreign aid for 
economic development” which requires the façade of an economic development 
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“machinery” that creates inefficiencies when compared to a traditional bribe.66  The 
duplicitous nature of this type of foreign aid is likely to leave both sides disappointed due 
to the lack of clear expectations.67  Another characteristic associated with foreign aid for 
economic development is the stipulation that the majority of the funds are spent in the 
donor’s economy.68  While aid may overtly make recipients dependent on the patron, 
sociologists describe another, less obvious, outcome of these programs. 
1. Social Hierarchies 
Tomohisa Hattori, an assistant professor of political science at Lehman College, 
construes foreign aid as means to dominate others by creating palatable social 
hierarchies.69  As a result, the gift of aid creates a dominant giver and a grateful 
recipient.70  Hattori cites sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in pointing out that there are “only 
two ways of getting and keeping a lasting hold over someone: gifts or debt.”71  
According to the giver-receiver hierarchy, the interest of the giver should prevail since 
the receiver must show gratitude.  Hattori claims that this system of relations embodies 
the Kantian view of international relations since it creates an option to avoid “the more 
standard recourse to violence or coercive means.”72  In simple terms, Hattori’s 
characterization describes a neo-colonial structure where imperial powers influence 
colonies through gifts instead of occupation.  This is hardly a peaceful arrangement based 
on the third world’s historical fight against imperialism and the failure to address the fact 
that inequality may lead to conflict. 
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2. Inequality and Instability 
Literature on the relationship between inequality and conflict is mainly limited to 
the scope of intrastate violence.  According to Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, 
“Income inequality increases socio-political instability.”73  Edward Muller and Mitchell 
Seligson support this interpretation of inequality’s role in conflict and expand on it to 
show that semi-repressive regimes increase the potential for violence.74  Frances 
Stewart’s concept of horizontal inequalities, or inequalities between groups versus 
economic classes, provides a concept that can be applied to the international realm.75  
According to her research, “The significance of any measure of inequality from a 
conflict-creation perspective is increased if it occurs systematically over a number of 
dimensions and grows over time.”76  Therefore, counter to Hattori’s claim that social 
hierarchies create platitudes when states give aid the perpetuation of such relationships, 
in lieu of creating more equal relationships, may provide the foundation for conflict.   
Although the rationality of states may prevent the manifestation of such violence, 
sub-state groups could be galvanized in response to the interstate relationship.  
Christopher Cramer concludes that, although “a relatively peaceable durable inequality” 
may exist, “sharp changes in the nature of the relationship between groups; external 
interventions; ideological shifts whereby injustices that were previously accepted come to 
be regarded as grounds for conflict, violent or nonviolent; and new possibilities of 
equality” may provide the impulse towards struggle.77 
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3. U.S. Foreign Aid to Egypt 
In light of these revelations, Hattori’s argument that gifts “naturalize” relations is 
misleading for two reasons: first, it assumes that recipient states are content with their 
dependencies on aid; second, it does not account for conditions demanded by the donor.78  
Egypt has acted counter to Hattori’s theory despite being the second largest recipient of 
U.S. aid.  The United States and Egypt signed the “Glide Path Agreement” in the late 
1990s that resulted in a 69 percent decrease in economic support funds to Egypt.79  
According to the Congressional Research Service, Egypt desires to “graduate from U.S. 
bilateral economic assistance” in part due to its “reluctance to accept conditions for U.S. 
aid” which indicates that aid has failed to naturalize the relationship.80  Hattori’s model 
failed in this case because U.S. economic aid to Egypt included conditions and, therefore, 
was not a gift; instead, it was a bribe according to Morgenthau’s definition.  Furthermore, 
the presence of conditions begets the observation that U.S. aid to Egypt is undertaken 
with the U.S. national interest in mind.  Research must determine whether the entirety of 
U.S. aid to Egypt focused on the nation’s transition to a democracy that respects human 
rights or other motivations. 
D. EGYPTIAN REFORM RELATIVE TO U.S. AID 
1. Foreign Aid as an Incentive for Reform 
When donors desire reform in a recipient nation then aid can act as an incentive.81  
Such policies may either make the availability of aid dependent on conditions or attempt 
to “alter the preferences and perceptions of the recipient.”82  When donors provide aid to 
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repressive regimes conditions are required if there is to be a positive effect on the social 
situation.83  Food aid is an example of subsistence aid that can be used as an incentive.  
In addition to being a “carrot,” food aid also has the potential to significantly alter a 
nation’s economy. 
According to Shiva, “The United States has used food control as a strategic 
objective as much as military.”84  Peter Uvin goes on to support this notion by observing 
that “part of all food aid is still given for economically or politically self-interested 
purposes, particularly by the United States.”85  There is a consensus that food aid 
presents more drawbacks than political and/or economic benefits.86 Some opine that food 
aid acts as an “overt attack on the survival of third world farmers and third world 
producers” due developed countries’ ability to charge lower prices.87  This is exacerbated 
by the encouragement to transition to crops that favor large landowners and create a 
dependency on imports.88  As a result, food trade liberalization, especially coupled with 
exposure to high producers’ low cost and infusions of food aid, degrades agricultural 
sectors in countries that open the market to international trade when they lack 
comparative advantage.89 
American food aid to Egypt became a means of U.S. support for the Mubarak 
regime.  The Food for Peace program led to many Egyptian farmers being unable to 
compete with the low prices of imports and created a national dependency on imported 
food.90  The erosion of the agricultural trade surplus in 1970 to a three billion dollar 
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deficit in the 1980s illustrates this shift in Egypt.91  According to Egyptian economist 
Galal Amin, “The weak performance of agriculture and industry can be partly explained 
by the state relaxing its role in those two sectors, an essential part of the model not only 
encouraged by virtually demanded by Washington.”92  The transition to agricultural areas 
of comparative advantage in the international market favored large landholders due to the 
“preoccupation with capital intensive export agriculture.”93  As Egypt’s dependence on 
imports such as wheat continued the regime, in turn, became dependent on both the food 
and economic aid the United States provided.  According to Dethier and Funk, “U.S. food 
aid [was] a prop for Egypt’s urban food pricing system, without which the Egyptian 
government would be in big trouble.”94  The Mubarak regime’s exploitation of cheap 
food prices by using aid and providing subsidies maintained a minimal level of 
legitimacy for the government.95  U.S. food aid provided a source of leverage that no 
U.S. president chose to use in order to further democracy or human rights in Egypt.96  As 
a result, observers of U.S. foreign aid in Egypt could contend that it supported the 
Mubarak regime. 
2. The Egyptian Status Quo 
The United States chose to ignore the lack of political reform in Egypt due to its 
overriding national interest in maintaining peace with Israel and access to natural 
resources.  One glaring example of Egypt’s failure to move toward improving human 
rights is the perpetuation of emergency rule since 1981.  According to Maye Kassem, this 
law, which must be renewed every three years, “provides the government with the legal 
right to control every level of political activity.”97  Emergency rule denies citizens the 
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right to judicial review and makes them vulnerable to arbitrary arrest.  One example of 
the latter is the regime’s apprehension of 54 leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood prior to 
the 1995 elections.98  Despite this overt disregard for the rule of law and human rights, 
the United States never placed democratic conditions on its foreign aid to Egypt.99  This 
position betrays the U.S. desire for stability via the Mubarak regime over the promotion 
of democracy and human rights in Egypt. 
3. Foreign Aid as an Engine for Reform 
Donors do not have to use aid as a leveraging tool to foster reform.  Aid or foreign 
direct investment (FDI) may produce economic growth (increasing gross domestic 
product [GDP] per capita) and/or human development (increasing human capital 
accompanied by economic growth), which can contribute to reform.100  Kosack and 
Tobin claim that FDI is the “largest and most stable source of external finance for 
developing countries” and has a better capability to improve human development due to 
its larger pool of resources and “its freedom from the disruptive interference of 
government.”101 Their research shows that the recipients of aid benefit most when aid 
focuses on human development and FDI is directed toward both human development and 
economic growth.102  Additionally, the amount of human capital present affects the 
benefits of aid and FDI.  High levels of pre-existing human capital creates a virtuous 
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opportunity for aid while limited sources of human capital at the time of investment 
limits growth.  In the worst case, extremely low cases of human capital actually result in 
retarded development.103  The downside of FDI reveals itself based on the method in 
which it is attracted.  If countries do not possess comparative advantage in an industry but 
create incentives for FDI it will create inefficiencies.  Additionally, if tax incentives drive 
FDI it may encourage domestic firms to relocate offshore and do more harm than good 
for the local economy and government revenue.104 
According to Stephen Kosack and Jennifer Tobin, economic growth is a product 
of human development.  As human development increases it fuels economic growth.  The 
increased revenues from the latter then reciprocate by increasing human development.  
However, economic development alone cannot spur human development and leads to 
unsustainable growth in the absence of the latter.105  Economic stimulus without a 
corresponding increase in human development results in a vicious cycle of increasing 
inequality.  Therefore, if governments do not prioritize human development aid may lead 
to a concentration of power in a minority ruling elite, creating greater inequality and less 
efficient economies. 
Viewed from another perspective, foreign aid may fail to instigate growth due to 
its fungible characteristic.  In this sense, it becomes a substitute “for government 
spending that would have occurred anyway.”106  Morgenthau asserts that economic 
foreign aid does not cause economic development because leaders “derive their political 
power in good measure from the economic status quo.”107  As a result, regimes use 
economic foreign aid to bolster support through patronage while maintaining control over 
the population’s economic status.  If governments do not prioritize human development 
then aid prevents benefits.108  According to Morgenthau, “Foreign aid for economic 
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development, then, has a very much smaller range of potentially successful operations 
than is generally believed.”109  This is a result of fostering economic development 
through free markets and democracy in societies that are unprepared for such 
operations.110  In lieu of giving up the objective of helping developing countries, this 
observation leads one to believe that a serial approach to democracy, followed by 
economic reform (or vice versa), is necessary.  The role human development plays in 
sustaining economic growth leads to the conclusion that democracy should be a pre-
requisite for economic progress. 
4. Measuring Egypt’s Reform 
After donating over $50 billion in aid to Egypt, and given its pro-democracy 
rhetoric since the end of the Cold War, one would expect the United States to be able to 
point to specific reforms or improvements in the field of human rights.111  In the worst 
case, the United States should be able to show that it curtailed foreign aid to Egypt on the 
basis of the nation’s failure to reform.  Despite the fact that no metrics show a significant 
increase in democracy or human rights improvements in Egypt, U.S. aid has remained 
relatively stable.112  In 2008, the National Defense Research Institute characterized Egypt 
as being “less democratic than it had been at any time” during Mubarak’s term.113  The 
fact that the United States supported the regime despite its continued repression leads 
Arab thinkers such as Ahmed Baha’ al-Din Sha’ban to declare that U.S. democratic 
rhetoric is the biggest hindrance to reform in the Middle East.114 
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Egypt became less democratic in the latter years of Mubarak’s rule.  According to 
the Economist Intelligence Unit, Egypt’s score on the democracy index decreased from 
3.89 to 3.07 between 2008 and 2010, resulting in the nation ranking 138th out of 167 
countries and scoring lower than the world average of 5.46. Egypt earned its lowest score 
in the category of “Electoral Process and Pluralism.”115  The highest level of opposition 
party victories occurred in the 1984 and 1987 elections, a feat that has not been matched 
in contests since that time.116  Prior to the 1995 elections, twenty-four Muslim 
Brotherhood leaders were arrested under the umbrella of emergency law.  In 2000, the 
regime arrested twenty Islamists that included “prominent professionals in the legal, 
medical, engineering, and academic spheres.”117  It is significant to note that these 
individuals were not charged with terrorism or any other form of violence, their only 
alleged crime was reviving the Muslim Brotherhood.118  In 2005, the government 
continued its policy of election year crackdowns by arresting demonstrators advocating 
democratic reform.  Despite this blatant disregard for democratic principles, the U.S. 
administrations took action to protect Egyptian aid one month after these developments 
occurred.119  Therefore, not only has U.S. aid to Egypt failed to encourage reforms, it has 
continued unabated despite a decrease in Egyptian democracy.  Although democratic 
reform retreated under Mubarak, Egypt has shown improvement in other areas. 
The human development index includes health, education, and income in order to 
provide a better illustration of a nation’s improvement or decline.  Egypt has experienced 
a 1.5 percent increase in its human development since 1970.  This places it above the 
regional average and it ranks as the eighth most improved nation in human development 
since 1980.   
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In 2010 Egypt ranked 101st out of 169 countries and, at a score of 0.620, falls below the 
world average of 0.624.120  However, its continued improvement is a positive sign for the 
nation’s economic growth. 
Foreign direct investment has been one variable that has changed significantly in 
Egypt’s recent history.  Despite increases in human development paralleling the 
increasing FDI, data from the World Bank does not lead to the conclusion that the two 
co-vary.  Egypt experienced an 8.2 percent increase in human development from 1995–
2000 with a 107 percent increase in FDI.  During the nation’s largest increase in FDI, 954 
percent between 2000–2005, human development increased only 3.7 percent, the lowest 
rate in the last 15 years.  Lastly, despite an average of $8.8 billion in FDI between 2006 
and 2009, the percent increase in human development did not match that achieved during 
1995–2000 when FDI averaged $611.8 million.121  One explanation for the lack of 
rapidly increasing human development in spite of increasing FDI could be inequality, 
which multiple scholars point out as endemic to Mubarak’s regime.122  Additionally, 
Egypt may not have reaped the benefits of the recent rise in FDI yet and it may take years 
for the nation to realize the human development or economic benefits.  For the time 
being, U.S. aid efforts to improve the economy via economic aid and FDI have not 
yielded significant effects on human development, and have illustrated the U.S. support 
for the status quo in lieu of meaningful democratic reform. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The United States has provided significant amounts of aid to the Government of 
Egypt for over 30 years.  This policy occurred despite a lack of democratic reform and 
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numerous accounts of human rights violations.123  Although the U.S. may not have 
intended its aid to perpetuate autocratic rule, it did not influence the government to 
reform or improve human rights and, therefore, indirectly supported the regime.  U.S. aid 
in Egypt has taken a separate trajectory from the democratic reform and human rights 
initiatives championed by multiple administrations and have led to incongruence between 
U.S. words and policy. 
The United States has successfully achieved certain national interests as a result 
of its aid to Egypt.  The peace between Israel and the majority of the Arab world has 
prevailed since 1979 and Egypt has opened up its economy to the global market while 
providing the United States opportunities for investment and trade.  Missing from U.S. 
achievements in Egypt are successful democratic reform and improvements in human 
rights.  The evidence suggests that U.S. interests in stability and trade are given higher 
priority than more open societies.  Over the past 30 years, Egyptian stability has been 
contingent upon the perpetuation of authoritarian rule in Egypt; this is based largely on a 
fear that the democratic process will lead to the election of less desirable political leaders.  
Such theories lead to the broader question of whether the security provided by democratic 
institutions is greater than the security provided by the repression of non-liberal 
opposition groups. 
The uncertainty following Egypt’s ousting of Mubarak illustrates that stability via 
support for undemocratic regimes is a short-term solution.  When both vertical and 
horizontal inequalities exist in society where an elite rule in lieu of law, the potential for 
violent solutions to problems remains a constant threat.  Currently, the widely accepted 
long-term solution that provides the most resilient stability is democracy and a respect for 
human rights.   
                                                 
123 In Behind Closed Doors, Human Rights Watch states, “Although the U.S. State Department in 
1992 provided a frank and generally accurate assessment of human rights violations in Egypt, Middle East 
Watch is not aware of one instance in 1990, 1991, or thus far this year when any administration 
spokesperson publicly made reference to human rights abuses in Egypt or to the need for the Mubarak 
government to address rights problems.” Human Rights Watch, Behind Closed Doors: Torture and 
Detention in Egypt (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992), 165.  Additionally, “despite the leverage that 
such aid and trade represent, the government of President Hosni Mubarak largely has escaped public 
scrutiny and sustained pressure from the United States and Europe to improve its mediocre human rights 
record and lift the long-standing state of emergency.” Ibid. 
 30 
By giving democratic reform low priority in Egypt, U.S. foreign aid has perpetuated (and 
potentially created new) causes for violence against both the Government of Egypt and 
the United States. 
If the United States is going to take a long-term approach to stability in Egypt 
then it must demand democratic reform.  The current program of aid without democratic 
conditions does not promote this cause.  The Office of the Inspector General has reported 
that USAID’s democracy programs, which include $200 million of discretionary 
allotments to Egyptian leadership per year, have not shown much success.124  Up until 
2005, the United States did not have a mechanism to ensure Egypt spent aid on 
democracy promotion.125  Furthermore, based on the State Department cables that were 
revealed on Wikileaks, Mubarak indicated that he was not interested in democracy.126  
Therefore, one option the U.S. government has in order to foster reform is to place 
conditions on Egypt’s aid package. 
A recent article in The Washington Post highlighted that conditional aid may not 
be a viable option for U.S. policy in Egypt.  According to Mary Beth Sheridan, a 
proposed “Senate bill would withhold up to $1.3 billion in U.S. [military] aid for 2012 
until the secretary of state certifies that Egypt has held democratic elections and is 
protecting freedoms of the press, expression, and association.”127  Egyptian officials 
responded by saying that such conditions “would be detrimental to future 
cooperation.”128  In the wake of the Arab Spring, the United States cannot afford to go so 
far as cancelling the Egyptian aid program altogether since it would present the view that 
the nation was abandoning democracy and reinforce the idea that the U.S. was 
inextricably linked to Mubarak. 
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Since the United States cannot cancel aid to Egypt it must assess the risk of 
putting conditions on aid against the potential for Egypt’s military leaders to exit 
America’s sphere of influence.  If the United States is committed to promoting 
democracy and human rights then it must change its foreign aid program to one that is 
only guaranteed by conditions that improve the recipient country’s record of democracy 
and human rights.  The United States may also elect to engage in multilateral aid 
programs, however, this may diminish its leadership role and leverage in the international 
arena. 
The correlation between U.S. aid and support for undemocratic regimes that do 
not respect human rights undermines America’s position as the leader of the free world.  
Chapter III discusses how the U.S. policy of extraordinary rendition further delegitimizes 
its promotion of democratic ideals and provides another means of support to Mubarak’s 
regime.  In addition to undermining its own message, U.S. policy has also tacitly enabled 
the repression of groups that seek democratic reform and has provided an engine for 
radicalization, as is discussed in Chapter IV. 
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III. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The rule of law provides the backbone for the United States’ model of liberal 
governance.  As the leading proponent of democratic reform in developing nations since 
the end of World War II, America must ensure its actions reflect its democratic ideals if it 
is to maintain legitimacy.  As Egypt struggles to transition to a new government in the 
wake of Hosni Mubarak’s ouster, it is important to examine if U.S. foreign policy in 
Egypt has advanced or hindered the rule of law concept—both for the United States and 
for post-Arab Spring Egypt. 
America has touted its respect for human rights and the rule of law as a theme for 
aggrandizing its moral position in struggles against other powers.  During the Cold War, 
Such figures as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) veteran Jack Devine believed that 
“communism could be beaten because our ideas and our society were better.  We didn’t 
need to descend to their level.”129  However, recent events have inspired some scholars to 
describe America as a “reckless, stumbling, delusional giant” that has lost its position of 
moral superiority based on policies, such as extraordinary rendition, that disrespect 
human rights and challenge the rule of law.130 
The U.S. policy of extraordinary rendition brings into question the integrity of the 
government’s adherence to the rule of law.  This principle is a critical element of 
democratic governance; therefore, extraordinary renditions—coupled with the record of 
American support for an authoritarian ruler who did not respect human rights—could 
undermine the legitimacy of the United States as a broker of freedom along with its 
democratic message.  Such inconsistencies may discourage Egypt from subscribing to 
America’s model and hamper the spread of democracy while providing a platform from 
which radical groups can campaign for their cause. 
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This chapter examines the U.S. policy of rendition and its relationship to the rule 
of law.  The objective is not to determine the legality of rendition; rather it is to expose 
the aspects that could be interpreted as extralegal based on the interpretation of federal 
and international law.  By doing so, the discussion will illustrate the contradictory 
relationship between extraordinary rendition and the promotion of the rule of law.  This 
contradiction deteriorates the U.S. position as a champion of human rights and 
delegitimizes the democratic message. 
First, this chapter outlines the basis for the rule of law in democracy.  Next, it 
examines the role of international law in U.S. federal law.  It compares the U.S. policy of 
rendition with applicable federal and international legal guidelines.  In addition to U.S. 
policy, the examination touches on the relationship between Egypt and United States in 
the rendition process and the repercussions of U.S. support for Hosni Mubarak.  
Ultimately, it aims to illustrate the fact that the extraordinary rendition policy and the 
U.S.’s catering to the authoritarian Egyptian regime undermined both America’s stature 
in the world and its democratic message, ultimately creating a less secure homeland. 
B. DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
The bedrock of democracy consists of human rights and the rule of law.  The U.S. 
Declaration of Independence clearly defines the meta-ethic that democratic government 
depends on the protection of certain “unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” through “Governments [that] are instituted among 
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”131  The mechanism 
that enables this action is a well-established set of “procedural norms” or the rule of 
law.132  The Declaration of Independence continues by highlighting the King’s failure to 
abide by the law as a cause for the creation of a separate state.  According to Michel 
Rosenfeld: “In the broadest terms, the rule of law requires that the state only subject the 
citizenry to publicly promulgated laws, and that the state’s legislative function be 
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separate from the adjudicative function, and that no one within the polity be above the 
law” (emphasis added).133  He goes on to identify the “essential characteristics of modern 
constitutionalism [as] limiting the powers of government, adherence to the rule of law, 
and protection of fundamental rights.”134  Similarly, USAID identifies the rule of law as 
“the cornerstone for all other elements of democracy.”135 Although many other crucial 
institutions either support or complement the rule of law in democracy, the latter is a key 
enabler of successful democratic governance. 
The U.S. Constitution, along with the laws passed to support it, provides ultimate 
guidance on maintaining order and enforcing norms.136  The Supremacy Clause declares: 
“The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made or which shall be made… shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land.”137  The Constitution caters to the sometimes divergent desires of the government 
and the people by creating a tension between the repressive nature of law, “the will of the 
majority,” and the citizens’ capacity to invoke statutes in order to resist state policy.138  If 
the rule of law does not maintain a bipartisan stance between the government and the 
people, then democracy slides toward autocracy. 
The rule of law has a more opaque role as its scope extends beyond national 
boundaries.  Sovereign states establish the rule of law with the intent to serve their 
citizens.  Therefore, civil rights do not transfer to aliens, especially on foreign soil.  
Conversely, the state’s duty to protect its citizens does not stop at the border.   
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As a result, sovereign nations often contend that the sanctity of their borders must be 
preserved; however, in order to protect these borders or their citizens, they claim the right 
to carry out acts outside those borders.  When states act outside their sovereign territory, 
their actions invoke international law.  
C. LEGAL REGIMES 
International law is not a new concept; treaties have existed since the creation of 
the nation-state.  However, the nature and scope of international law, also referred to as 
the Law of Nations, has evolved in the recent past—most notably by shifting from a 
focus on interstate relations to state-citizen relations and human rights.139  According to 
Linde, international law springs from the liberal society concept; therefore, it requires 
that no polity be above its jurisdiction.140     
The oft-debated relationship between U.S. federal law and international law does 
little to ameliorate controversy regarding the sovereignty of the United States and its 
extraterritorial pursuits to preserve itself.  According to A. John Rasdan: “It has been the 
position of legal counsel, whether under Democrats or Republicans, that the President 
may act contrary to the international law if necessary to execute the Constitution and 
other American laws.”141  The executive branch’s eschewing of international law creates 
further dissonance on the limits of U.S. policy and presents potential challenges to the 
integrity of the U.S. democratic message. 
International law is an inherent component of U.S. federal law.  The U.S. 
Constitution explicitly incorporates it by including treaties in the description of the 
“Supreme Law of the Land.”142  However, experts point out that the Constitution fails to 
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address customary international law, which this paper defines as norms that are common 
among nations and are inspired by the notion that they conform to an overarching 
international legal premise.143  The resulting debate focuses on whether or not the United 
States is required to abide by customary international law, since it is not codified in 
treaty, federal statute, or the Constitution, and the Supremacy Clause neither confirms nor 
denies its role in the U.S. rule of law.144  Despite the debate over whether the United 
States must abide by customary international law, there is a consensus that the United 
States does treat customary international law as federal law.  Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy is one example of the Supreme Court’s interpretation that, in the absence 
of Constitutional decree, federal statute, or judicial ruling the Law of Nations applies.145 
More recently, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain supported 
international law’s relevancy in federal common law.146  The first case concerned the 
kidnapping, torture, and murder of Joelito Filartiga in Paraguay and provides an example 
of a U.S. court decision against a defendant based on a foreign national’s actions in a 
foreign state.  After Alerico Norberto Pena-Irala escaped criminal prosecution in 
Paraguay, he moved to the United States, where the Filartigas sought to bring a civil suit 
against him in the Eastern District of New York.  After the court approved Pena’s motion 
to dismiss the case based on a lack of jurisdiction, the Filartigas appealed to the Second 
Circuit.147  In the Second Circuit’s ruling on Filartiga it affirmed the applicability of the 
Law of Nations in federal law as a basis for trying Pena for wrongful death.  Justice 
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Kaufman stated: “We find that an act of torture committed by a state official against one 
held in detention violates established norms of the international law of human rights, and 
hence the law of nations.”148  He goes on to declare: “The constitutional basis for the 
Alien Tort Statute is the law of nations, which has always been part of federal common 
law.”149  The Second Circuit’s ruling against a foreign citizen in a foreign nation required 
it to invoke international law because U.S. law does not apply to foreign citizens outside 
the country. 
Similarly, Humberto Alvarez-Machain was a Mexican national accused of being 
involved in the torture of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent Enrique Camarena-
Salazar in Mexico. After his acquittal in United States Supreme Court, Alvarez sought 
compensation in a civil suit for false arrest and a violation of the Law of Nations.150  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled against Alvarez’s claims based on the lack of a 
“binding customary rule” on which he might base such a claim. 151 The Supreme Court’s 
failure to rule in favor of Alvarez illustrated that the U.S. legal system uses customary 
international law when it declared that Alvarez’s defense of arbitrary detention “violates 
no norm of customary international law” as grounds to deny his claim.152  Filartiga and 
Alvarez-Machain elucidate the U.S. Constitution’s incorporation of international law, 
including customary international law, into federal law.153   
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Therefore, the U.S. democracy and its rule of law incorporate both international law and 
customary international law.  The United States must consider each of these legal 
imperatives when it crafts foreign policy.154 
Linde goes so far as to describe the United States as a “pariah among liberal 
democracies” in recent history due to his belief that the executive showed wanton 
disregard for international law.155  As a result of multiple recent unilateral policies the 
“U.S. international law record, particularly in the human rights realm, is inconsistent at 
best, hypocritical at worst, but clearly incoherent.”156 Legal counsel immediately after 
the attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), illustrated a new interpretation of the rule of 
law as lawyers John Yoo and Alberto Gonzales, among others, advised the executive that 
he “had almost unfettered latitude in his prosecution of the war on terror.”157  Two 
factions interpret this development in very different lights.  Some contend that the actions 
taken, regardless of whether they adhered to international rule of law, were warranted 
since they were done in the interest of national security and the spreading of 
democracy.158  On the other hand, Jane Mayer contends the policies the United States 
carried out in the wake of 9/11 presented the “most radical challenge to the rule of law in 
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American history.”159  Because the United States has incorporated international law into 
its legal system, analysis of U.S. policy must include both international law and 
customary international law as litmus.  If U.S. policy operates outside these guidelines 
then it compromises the nation’s role as the champion of human rights and democratic 
rule. 
D. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 
1. Types of Rendition 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines rendition as “the return of a fugitive to the State 
in which he is accused to having committed a crime.”160Grey describes rendition as “the 
transfer of a prisoner by U.S. government agents without any kind of formal extradition 
proceedings or legal hearing.”161  He goes on to delineate a different type of procedure, 
called extraordinary rendition, which is “the transfer of a prisoner by U.S. agents to any 
place but an American court of law.”162  Although types of rendition have occurred since 
the Reagan Administration, the nature of the policy has changed with the international 
environment.  According to Rasdan, extraordinary rendition has been necessary “because 
the countries in which the suspects found themselves were unsafe, dysfunctional, or 
unwilling to cooperate fully with the American government.”163  One challenge to 
extraordinary rendition concerns the power of the executive in the U.S. democracy.  The 
system of checks and balances within the U.S. government manage the magnitude of the 
executive’s power, one being judicial review that provides a mechanism to assess the 
legality of actions.  The role of this element in U.S. democracy is important to keep in 
mind when comparing pre-9/11 renditions to those that occurred after the attacks. 
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Before 9/11, publicly available accounts of rendition illustrate that operations 
showed a basic level of respect for the rule of law.  Operation Goldenrod undertook the 
rendition of Fawaz Yunis from international waters to the United States for his 
connection to airline hijackings in the 1980s.164  According to Rasdan, the CIA avoided 
extradition because of the unreliability of Lebanon’s government.165  The rendition 
respected international rule of law because it did not take place within another sovereign 
nation, was based on a federal arrest warrant issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ), 
and ended with Yunis receiving a trial in the United States.166  Therefore, the arrest of 
Yunis was by no means extraordinary, violated no legal precedent, and was carried out 
with the supervision of the executive and judicial branches.  However, when suspects 
remain within a state that does not have the will or capability to extradite them to the U.S. 
that state’s sovereignty presents legal roadblocks to the U.S. goal of bringing individuals 
living overseas to trial. 
U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain illustrates another type of rendition meant to avoid U.S. 
liability in operating outside the rule of law.  In this case, the Mexican government did 
not agree to extradite the suspect, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, despite the United States 
indicting him and issuing an arrest warrant for involvement in the death of a DEA 
officer.167  In order to render Alvarez without having U.S. agents violate Mexico’s 
sovereignty, “the DEA hired Mexican nationals to capture him and bring him to the 
United States.”168  After his arrival and arrest in the United States, Alvarez challenged 
the government in court by alleging that the United States had violated its extradition 
treaty with Mexico.  The Supreme Court ruled that the method by which the suspect 
entered the United States had “no bearing on the jurisdiction of the federal court.”169  
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Therefore, the Supreme Court, while not endorsing such methods of rendition, was 
complicit with the notion that they were not extralegal tools of U.S. policy under these 
circumstances.  Weissbrodt and Bergquist contend that, by turning a blind eye to the act 
of kidnapping that permitted Alvarez’s arrest, the Supreme Court exhibited a “cavalier 
disregard for international law” that would foster the evolution of the U.S. extraordinary 
rendition policy.170 
The Yunis and Alvarez cases are fundamentally different because the transfer of 
the latter was not carried out directly by U.S. agents and it originated in a sovereign state.  
However, they share the common traits that both men were charged with a crime and 
delivered to America for purpose of a trial in court.  Extraordinary rendition emerged 
during the Clinton Administration and changed the nature of the policy.  In response to 
the terrorist threat, extraordinary renditions did not require U.S. courts to charge the 
rendered individual with a specific crime, included the seizure of suspects in foreign 
countries, and resulted in the United States delivering those individuals to a foreign 
state.171  In addition to the operational changes, extraordinary renditions included a 
change of objectives—the process focused on delivering suspects to other countries for 
the purpose of intelligence gathering rather than for criminal trial.172 
The practice of extraordinary rendition in the 1990s appeared to abide by U.S. law 
while presenting potential challenges in the light of international law.  Presidential 
Decision Directive (PDD)-39 states: “Return of suspects by force may be affected 
without the cooperation of the host government.”173  This policy provides executive 
authorization for U.S. agents to remove suspects from sovereign nations with or without 
those nations’ consent.  Although Ker v. Illinois is another example, affirmed by Alvarez-
Machain, that illustrates the judicial branch’s lack of concern for the “manner in which 
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[the suspect] arrives in the court,” the opinion remains nebulous on whether it condones 
what sovereign states may consider kidnapping.174 
Despite PDD-39’s aggressive wording, rendition operations before 9/11 were 
structured to minimize the potential that critics would label them as extralegal.  
According to Weissbrodt and Bergquist: “The receiving country had to have issued an 
arrest warrant… the Administration scrutinized each rendition… [and] the CIA notified 
the local government and obtained an assurance from the receiving government that it 
would not ill-treat the individual.”175  One example of such an action took place with the 
“Returnees from Albania.”  In this rendition the United States worked with Albanian 
authorities to arrest six men associated with Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s second in 
command, in the lead up to U.S. operations in Kosovo.176  The U.S. cooperation with 
Albania, and the fact that the suspects had either Egyptian warrants or convictions in 
absentia, reduced the legal jeopardy of the operation.  On the other hand, Egypt’s poor 
human rights record brought into question the legality of U.S. actions under Article 3 of 
the United Nations (U.N.) Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which this paper will cover in more detail 
later.  In what critics of rendering suspects to Egypt could characterize as an ethical 
victory, the United States eventually shied away from working with the regime on 
renditions. According to The Washington Post, “After years of fruitless talks in Egypt, 
President Bill Clinton cut off funding and cooperation with the directorate of Egypt’s 
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general intelligence service, whose torture of suspects has been a perennial theme in State 
Department human rights reports.”177 
2. Rendition Policy After 9/11 
The U.S. policy of rendition largely adhered to the spirit of the rule of law before 
9/11 despite some potential deviations from CAT.  The Clinton Administration’s respect 
for its obligation to international law resulted in an apparent restriction on extraordinary 
renditions involving receiving countries that subscribed to torture.  In doing so, the 
administration maintained some U.S. control over the treatment of a subject after he/she 
arrived in the receiving state.  The Bush Administration’s extraordinary rendition policy 
with Egypt after 9/11 forfeited U.S. control of individuals’ rights to Egyptian authorities 
and bifurcated extraordinary rendition and any clear adherence to the rule of law. 
The unilateral delivery of individuals to foreign countries makes the United States 
vulnerable to critiques that its policies are extralegal.  The three main components of the 
debate surrounding this subject are the lack of judicial or executive review, the sovereign 
rights of states, and torture.  After 9/11, the evolution of the U.S. extraordinary rendition 
policy deviated from the rule of law. 
The executive’s ability to change the course of U.S. policy is rooted in specific 
interpretations of the U.S. Constitution.  David Addington, legal counsel to Vice 
President Cheney, advised the Administration that (according to the Constitution), “The 
President, as Commander in Chief, had the authority to disregard virtually all previously 
known legal boundaries if national security demanded it.”178  This approach to national 
security, manifested in an extraordinary rendition program that executed at the edge of 
the legal envelope, provides substantial evidence to enable scholars to question the rule of 
law’s status in U.S. foreign policy and may undermine U.S. status and its democratic 
message abroad. 
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Unlike the close control of renditions that required a warrant and review by the 
executive branch before 9/11, after the terror attacks, President Bush issued a 
“memorandum of notification” that waived the requirement for “White House, 
Department of State, or DOJ approval of individual prisoner’s transfers.”179  While this 
action does not cause the policy to take on an extralegal nature, the removal of judicial 
review stifles the judiciary’s constitutional duty to interpret applicable laws and reduces 
the legitimacy of a policy’s methods, especially when coupled with a lack of executive 
oversight. 
Under federal law, legal scholars can construe the removal of an individual from a 
sovereign nation, without using tools such as extradition, as kidnapping.  U.S. code 
describes kidnapping as the “unlawful seizure of a person.”180  Detaining an individual 
without a warrant is one example of an unlawful seizure and is kidnapping in United 
States or foreign jurisdictions.  Cases of extraordinary rendition since 9/11 have included 
instances of bilateral cooperation and unilateral action; the latter involves the act of 
kidnapping.181   
One example of an extraordinary rendition operating outside the rule of law was 
the seizure of Abu Omar (Osama Nasr) in Milan in 2003.182  The United States rendered 
Abu Omar from Italy to Egypt based on his alleged ties to al-Qaeda despite his having 
been granted asylum in Italy.183  Ultimately, an Italian court held the CIA accountable for 
the kidnapping of Abu Omar by convicting 22 officers, along with a U.S. Air Force 
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officer, in 2009.184  In this case, the unlawful seizure of a protected citizen in a foreign 
nation qualified as kidnapping under both international and U.S. law.  Therefore, the Abu 
Omar case provides one example of extraordinary rendition taking on an extralegal nature 
and attempting to operate outside the rule of law by violating a sovereign nation 
(international law) and unlawfully seizing an individual (international, Italian, and U.S. 
law).   
3. Extraordinary Rendition and Democracy 
The cleavage between U.S. policies regarding extraordinary rendition and the 
democratic ideal that champions the rule of law and human rights delegitimizes U.S. 
status and initiatives overseas.  The “Jenin Paradox” threatens to create counterproductive 
effects when state power is used in a manner that does not reflect the rule of law.  Former 
MI6 officer Alstair Crooke describes this condition as the result of brutal measures that 
create more new enemies through radicalization than it kills.185  U.S. extraordinary 
renditions have the potential to help radicalize both the individuals that the United States 
renders as well as those that lose faith in U.S. democratic benevolence due to policies that 
operate without considerable regard for the rule of law.186  In addition to the 
aforementioned legal and political challenges, under the purview of CAT, U.S. rendering 
of suspects to Egypt presents another potential compromise of international and U.S. law 
that challenges democratic ideals in both the United States and, potentially, in Egypt. 
E. TORTURE 
The U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) defines torture and provides verbiage that prohibits both 
torture and complicity in the act.  Article 1 describes torture as “severe pain or suffering, 
physical or mental… intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
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from him or a third person a confession” (emphasis added) and specifies further that the 
“pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”.187  This 
definition fails to define what constitutes a confession and what constitutes severe pain or 
suffering.  From a legal perspective, if the torture is intended to produce information 
instead of the individual’s confession then a defendant could argue that it is not in 
violation of Article 1.  The definition of severe pain or suffering is a topic addressed in 
U.S. legal discussions regarding its own torture legislation. 
U.S. legal code defines torture as “an act committed by a person acting under the 
color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain.”188  In 2002, 
Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee decreed that U.S. law defined severe physical pain 
as “of an intensity akin to that which accompanies serious physical injury such as death 
or organ failure.”189  According to Grey, varying interpretations of the adjective severe 
could provide lacunae in the law and reduce grounds for legal challenges to “stressful 
questioning procedures.”190  Therefore, international and U.S. use of the term severe to 
define torture does not provide clear evidence that extraordinary rendition is illegal under 
Article 3 of CAT that states, “No party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a 
person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be 
in danger of being subjected to torture.”191 
The U.S. Congress ratified the CAT in 1994 “subject to certain declarations, 
reservations, and understandings.”192  As a result, U.S. law incorporated the CAT 
definition that added the stipulation that the act of torture can occur through “consent or 
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acquiescence” and is not limited to the actual person committing the torture.193  In 
addition to Article 3’s limits on extraordinary rendition and extradition, Article 4 directs 
states to criminalize torture, including “complicity.”194  Furthermore, Title 8 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations (CFR) states, “Acquiescence of a public official requires that the 
public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity 
and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such 
activity.”195  Pursuant to these legal guidelines, if U.S. officials had “substantial grounds” 
to believe Egypt would torture rendered individuals then the state had violated both 
international and U.S. law. 
The U.S. government has some recourse when addressing potential CAT 
violations in renditions to Egypt.  Prior to 2004, the DOJ determined that “despite the fact 
that one may know for certain that torture will occur, it does not equate to specific 
intent.”196  In 2004 DOJ, while not reneging on its aforesaid statement, advised the 
President that it would not use such logic to approve what could be construed as 
torture.197  If the United States had used the lack of specific intent as a means to deny 
consent, acquiescence, or party to torture in Egypt prior to 2004, then the change in 
policy is indicative of the potentially extralegal nature of earlier actions. 
F. DEBATE OVER EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 
The policy of extraordinary rendition provides a means for the United States to 
disrupt terrorist operations against its interests with less legal constraints.  The 
executive’s ability to bypass legal processes provides the capability to rapidly act on 
information in order to pursue elusive targets or halt imminent attacks.198  Additionally, 
outsourcing the detainment of individuals lessens the burden on the U.S. legal and 
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detention system.199  According to Grey, the operations that netted Khalid Sheik 
Mohammad and Abu Zubaydah both provided useful information for U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts.200  On the other hand, the Maher Arar case is indicative of a 
policy that may victimize innocent people and Abu Omar’s extraordinary rendition 
illustrates an operation that interfered with an ongoing investigation by the host nation.201  
One other topic of debate that is a byproduct of the policy is torture. 
Two facets of the argument over torture concern legality and ethics.  This thesis 
has already established the legal premise against torture, although there have been 
arguments that challenge that assertion.202  The Office of Legal Counsel’s decision that 
detainees were not entitled to certain rights set the course for the administration’s 
rationalization of torture without judicial review.  It is not surprising that there is wide 
consensus among scholars and law-makers that torture is not only illegal, it presents 
serious ethical dilemmas.203 
Although the law may ban torture (and, therefore, extraordinary rendition that 
leads to torture) arguments exist that call for its use in specific situations.  Associate 
Professor of Philosophy Fritz Allhoff examines the subject in detail in his article 
“Terrorism and Torture.”  His analysis indicates that states may validate torture by 
relying on the utilitarian argument that contends that the benefit for the greater good 
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outweighs the value of respecting the individual’s rights.204  Michael Levin’s illustrates 
this by describing the dilemma of torturing a recalcitrant terrorist that refuses to reveal 
the location of a bomb that will kill thousands imminently or accepting mass death.205  In 
this case, torture provides for the greatest good and can therefore be construed as the 
ethical choice. 
On the other hand, Allhoff points out that, from a deontological perspective, 
torture is never acceptable.  This is based on the fact that it uses the individual as a means 
to an end an, in doing so does not “respect him as an autonomous agent and constitutes an 
attack on is dignity.”206  However, this ultimately returns to the utilitarian argument since 
the interrogator has a duty to both fulfill his office that requires the protection of the 
masses while respecting the rule of law (i.e. the prisoner’s rights).  In this tragic moral 
dilemma, the former typically takes precedence over the latter and may result in a 
justification of torture, especially if one subscribes to the belief that a terrorist’s actions 
invalidate certain rights.207  However, this belief presumes that the detainee is guilty of a 
crime, which requires a trial in the United States legal system.  As a result, the ethical 
debate over extraordinary rendition, and its common byproduct of torture, returns to the 
legal realm for analysis. 
In order to overcome the potential for compromising legal integrity, Alan 
Dershowitz suggests that the government create rules to regulate torture.  Included in 
these rules would be the requirement that the President “sign a torture warrant in which 
he says, ‘I’m taking responsibility for breaking the law, for violating treaties, for doing an 
extraordinary act of necessity.’”208  This approach blatantly disrespects democracy’s 
principle of the rule of law by condoning illegal action and circumventing the judiciary’s 
responsibility to check the executive. 
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Those in opposition to torture point out that not only is it illegal in accordance 
with federal and international law, it often results in unreliable information and it 
destroys America’s image overseas.  The case of Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi is perhaps the 
most infamous case of misinformation through torture since, while under duress, he 
provided false testimony that was used to support the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 
2003.  Furthermore, when a proxy such as Egypt carries out such tactics it is extremely 
difficult for patrons to determine if information is useful or not.209  Grey points out that, 
ultimately, as a country that champions the rule of law and human rights, the United 
States cannot allow “torture… [to help] shape how the rest of the world sees us” since it 
is discordant instead of congruous with democracy.210 
F. EGYPT’S ROLE IN RENDITION 
Egypt has a long record of human rights abuse.  The U.S. State Department has 
published reports that illustrate its awareness of these violations.  The 2003 report, issued 
the same year as Abu Omar’s extraordinary rendition to Egypt, stated that that nation’s 
record on human rights was marred by torture committed by both state and local 
police.211  Assuming the Department of State uses U.S. federal law’s definition of 
torture, this report indicates that Egypt’s security apparatus’ techniques met both U.S. 
legal and CAT definitions of torture.  Since the United States possessed this information, 
and supported by the fact that U.S. criminal law considers tacit understanding as evidence 
of the crime of conspiracy to torture, Abu Omar’s rendition to Egypt is an example of 
U.S. policy deviating from the rule of law.212 
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On the other hand, one legal argument focuses on the quantification of 
“substantial grounds” that indicate the potential that an individual would be tortured.  
According to the U.S. Senate, “substantial grounds” equates to greater than a 50 percent 
chance of being tortured.213  This formulation coincides with the Seventh Circuit’s ruling 
in Rashiah v. Ashcroft that declared the potential that the individual will be tortured 
matters more than the country’s human rights record.214  Therefore, if an individual does 
not belong to a group that has been persecuted by the receiving state, it is very difficult to 
prove that there is reason to believe they will be tortured.  These facts could provide a 
basis for the United States to categorize an extraordinary rendition as lawful despite a 
receiving country’s poor record on human rights. 
G. CONCLUSION 
This research has focused primarily on the U.S. policy of rendition in order to 
examine if it adheres to the democratic ideal promoted by American leadership.  Recent 
extraordinary rendition policy has illustrated disregard for international law and human 
rights, making it resemble a tool of more coercive governments that the United States 
typically travails against.  Although these measures may seem necessary for short-term 
security and stability, the United States must consider the long-term effects of policies 
that may decrease the legitimacy of both democracy and the nation’s status as a leader in 
human rights. 
Extraordinary rendition and torture are not compatible with democratic 
governance.  The former is a practice that is unnecessary given the fact that countries 
already have extradition agreements.  One potential side effect of extraordinary rendition, 
torture, is a violation of the rule of law and, according to many scholars and practitioners, 
does not provide reliable results.  Current legal definitions of torture skew the debate 
away from the most important effects of U.S. policy. 
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The rule of law depends on clear guidance or consistent interpretation in order to 
maximize legitimacy.  The U.S. policy of extraordinary rendition, along with U.S. 
support for Mubarak’s authoritarian government, has relied on novel interpretations of 
law.  It is critical that U.S. policy respects the role of all forms of international law in its 
implementation.  The U.S. Constitution and court rulings clearly support the 
incorporation of international law into federal law.  The belief that the President can 
temporarily annul his obligation to international law is unconstitutional since 
international law is an integral part of the Constitution. 
Democratization is one policy that the Middle East can use to help itself emerge 
from the current crisis.  When U.S. programs delegitimize liberal ideals it may cause 
Arab countries to shun democratic reform.  Chapter IV examines how U.S. aid to 
repressive regimes—along with its U.S. policy’s disregard for the rule of law—inhibits 
reform, foments radicalization, and reduces American security. 
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IV. U.S. POLICY AND POLITICAL ISLAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Political Islam has been the subject of scholarly debate for much of the past 40 
years.  The fall of communism has led to U.S. policymakers adjusting their focus towards 
terrorist acts committed by Islamic extremists.  Islamic groups have been responsible for 
the majority of actual or planned attacks against the United States since the end of the 
Cold War.  Many experts would consider Al Qaeda the most recognized terrorist group 
after its attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11).  Since the events of that day, the United 
States has foiled at least 41 additional terrorist plots on American soil or on airlines 
enroute to the nation215.  All of the these attacks, along with U.S. Army Major Nidal 
Hasan’s deadly assault at Fort Hood, Texas, have included links to radical Islamic 
groups.  Such groups characterize one extreme of the political Islam spectrum and, in 
order to relate U.S. policy to terrorism, it is crucial that research examines how policies 
interact with these groups’ radicalization. 
If policymakers can quell the scope of radicalization they will help limit the threat 
to the United States and increase homeland security.  However, dialogue focused on only 
the radical portion of political Islam that represents the fringe may cause a 
mischaracterization of Muslim politics and prevent policymakers from discovering other 
factors that may contribute to decreased national security.  Therefore, research must 
encompass the broader question of how U.S. policy empowers or inhibits political Islam 
at both ends of the political spectrum. 
This chapter relates a theory of radicalization to U.S. foreign policy in order to 
illustrate how America has directly contributed to the radicalization of Islamists through 
foreign aid and extraordinary rendition.  In addition to decreasing homeland security by 
providing a cause for extremists to galvanize against, U.S. foreign policy stifles the 
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progress of moderate political Islam.  In order to elucidate this concept, this chapter will 
demonstrate how the aforementioned U.S. policies have indirectly undermined these 
moderate arms’ attempts to hasten a transition to democracy in Egypt. 
The discussion begins by establishing a working definition of political Islam in 
the context of current literature and briefly examining the historical relation between 
Islam and the state.  Next, it juxtaposes the concept of political Islam against the 
democratic norms of secularism and political participation.  The research highlights the 
case of Egypt, drawing on discussions from earlier chapters, to illustrate U.S. foreign 
policy’s effect on political Islam.  Lastly, the discussion uses a psychological model for 
determining the interrelatedness of U.S. foreign policy and radicalization. 
B. POLITICAL ISLAM 
Political Islam spans a vast scope of topics and is not limited to the subject of 
religion in the state.  According to Peter Mandaville, “Islam and politics commingle in 
almost infinite variety across a vast range of settings, issues, actors, and levels of 
analysis.”216  While political Islam may be a broad concept, consensus exists that 
individual Islamist movements tend to galvanize based on local conditions.217  According 
to American policymakers, the allure of Islamism is based in deteriorating “socio-
economic and political conditions” and does not represent a new, competing ideology in 
competition with democracy.218  Fawaz Gerges supports this claim by describing 
America’s historical stance on freedom of religion as a position that puts it in a 
supportive position of Islam instead of being engaged in a clash of civilizations.219 
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Literature sometimes characterizes political Islam as a radical agenda that hastens 
a return to the “Golden Age” of the religion.220  In order to achieve this goal nations must 
make politics “subservient to religion” with the rule of law based solely on shari’a 
(Islamic law) since Islam recognizes God as the only sovereign.221  A chasm divides the 
liberal and radical Islamists over whether society should base politics on a literal 
interpretation of the Qur’an or as articulations “to match with prevailing norms.”222  
Instead of having a discrete set of societal or political norms, political Islam may serve 
governments better when it acts as a meta-ethic from which norms precipitate.  Prior to 
expanding on this concept, it is import to outline the evolving perspectives of political 
Islam. 
1. The “Failure” of Political Islam 
In his analysis of political Islam, Olivier Roy characterizes the movement as a 
failure that is advocating a globalized application of Islam.  In Globalized Islam, Roy 
states that contemporary Islamists can “either opt for political normalization within the 
framework of the modern nation-state, or evolve towards what [he] termed 
neofundamentalism, a closed, scripturalist and conservative view of Islam that rejects the 
national and statist dimension in favor of the ummah, the universal community of 
Muslims, based on shari’a (Islamic law).”223  He goes on to point out that his concept of 
neofundamentalism describes a phenomenon that does not form distinct groups (i.e. states 
or political parties) but is an agent that radicalizes individuals outside the tradition Arab 
region.224  This thesis will not focus on the individualized Islamism Roy describes in 
order to limit its scope, although the relevance of individual radical Islamists to U.S. 
homeland security demands further scrutiny. 
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Roy contends that “post-Islamism means privatization of re-Islamization.”225  In 
essence, this indicates a tendency to strive towards the establishment of Islamic society 
through individual effort and implies a separation of individual religious effort from 
government.  Prior to concluding that this implies a divorce between religion and 
government in Muslim societies, research must examine the context of secularism in the 
religion.  The non-existence of a cohesive Islamist movement leads scholars to claim that 
political Islam has failed. 
Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel contend that Islamism has been abandoned and the 
world is witnessing “post-Islamism.”226  According to this theory, Islamic groups failed 
to achieve the objective of usurping political power and have “molded themselves into 
the framework of existing states.”227  If Islamists are integrating into political systems 
this indicates that an organized, liberal camp may exist counter to Roy’s stateless, radical 
neofundamentalists.  Additionally, Kepel’s claim that groups championing concepts 
parallel to Western ideals—such as human rights and freedom of expression—are 
abandoning Islam fails to consider the role of these ethics in the religion.228  Further 
research, based on a broad concept of political Islam versus a discrete set of norms, must 
determine if common ground exists between this type of political thought and more 
liberal government. 
2. The Failure of Post-Islamism 
Mandaville argues against Roy’s presentation of post-Islamism since Islamist 
movements have historically lacked coherency and, therefore, cannot produce a logical 
follow-on movement.229  Instead, he characterizes “new Islamists” as those that embrace 
“pragmatism and policy rather than public virtue” as the impetus behind their actions.230  
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Instead of concluding that moderate Islamist positions equate to the deterioration of Islam 
in politics, he outlines the potential that Islam is capable of evolving in its political role. 
Political Islam does not conform to a single ideology since states vary in the 
methods in which they incorporate Islam into “government, domestic programs, and 
foreign policies.”231  Iran and Sudan provide examples of radical Islamic states that have 
become characterizations of political Islam.  By labeling these regimes as terrorist 
organizations, the United States potentially implies that political Islam is limited to 
radical groups.232  Egypt has been a more moderate nation by tolerating Islamic influence 
and creating “a more centrist social and political activism; normalized and 
institutionalized.”233  Despite these apparent differences between Islamist approaches to 
politics, debate continues over whether a spectrum exists in political Islam or if there is 
no difference between radical and moderate Islamists.234 
In “Political Islam and the West: A New Cold War or Convergence?” Michael 
Salla describes perspectives on political Islam with more detail.  He explains that political 
scientists such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington are essentialists “who use a 
limited number of conceptual categories and apply these universally in their analysis of 
political Islam.235  Counter to this limited characterization of groups, the contingencist 
camp—which includes scholars such as John Esposito—views political Islam as a less 
rigid framework that includes a “diversity of Islamic actors and movements” that cannot 
be adequately addressed with “predetermined presumptions and reactions.”236  Salla 
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presents a third perspective that he coins as the convergence thesis.  He suggests that 
essentialist and contingencist views are rendered less useful by their “methodological 
approaches” and that scholars must treat political Islam as a “paradigm that is in direct 
competition with liberal democracy in terms of the universal appeal and scope of their 
respective norms.”237  Although the norms of these two systems may in fact clash, 
research must examine if commensalism exists between political Islam and liberal 
democracy at the meta-ethical level in order to properly categorize the former. 
3. Political Islam as a Meta-Ethic 
Based on the current literature, political Islam cannot be limited to either radical 
or liberal groups.  Therefore, scholars and policymakers cannot treat its political ideology 
as a discrete value and it should not be categorized as authoritarian, nomocratic, or 
democratic by default.  This thesis considers political Islam an environment of theory 
whose “core concerns are temporal and political” and relies on “the Qur’an, the hadiths 
(reports about the words and deeds of Muhammad and his companions), and other 
canonical texts to justify [any] stances and actions.”238  Political Islam’s nature is as 
widely ranging as the topics it addresses and should not be tied to any other political or 
social system.  Rather, it is a perspective that varies with the way in which one interprets 
the religious texts and is not bound by modern political constraints but only one’s ability 
to comprehend Islamic guidance and the core values it prescribes. 
C. ISLAM AND THE STATE 
Current rhetoric from radical groups often calls for the establishment of an 
Islamic state and/or a resurrection of the caliphate.  Despite their effect on the media, 
such initiatives do not possess very strong support in the form of historical precedents.  
Ultimately, the more extreme political Islam becomes in its quest for an Islamic state, the 
less legitimate it becomes. 
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There is wide consensus that Islam, based on the Qur’an and other religious 
documents, provides very little guidance on politics and government.239  Nazih Ayubi 
explains that the religious texts do not address how to “form states, run governments, and 
manage organization” in significant detail.240  Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev, when 
addressing radical Islam, opine that it “cannot provide a working, alternate model for 
organizing society.”241  Therefore, the fact that the Qur’an does not provide guidance on 
state building indicates that the idea of an Islamic state may be chimera. Current literature 
complements this thesis’s notion of political Islam while deconstructing the concept of an 
Islamic state. 
The prevailing argument for an Islamic state does not incorporate the structures 
necessary to support the government and does not accurately interpret history.  The lack 
of guidance on creating institutions in Islamic religious texts undermines the concept of 
establishing “utopian Islam”.242  Scholars cite Egypt’s Islamic Jihad and Islamic Group 
as examples of political Islam movements that did not provide solutions in governance 
and only sought to gain state power; their failure was rooted in the inability to establish 
effective institutions to improve socio-economic conditions.243  One potential 
explanation for this failure of ideology is the historical misunderstanding of the origins of 
government in the Arab world. 
The caliphate ruled authoritarian states that were not subservient to Islamic 
practices.  According to Ayubi, politics were a product “of the economic requirements 
and cultural traditions of the territories that eventually formed the Islamic dominion.”244  
The central role of the state in economics led to authoritarian rule that relied on military 
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and physical power legitimized by Islam.245  As a result, the states of the caliphate were 
not Islamic states; rather, the caliphates were empires that co-opted Islam in order to 
achieve “ideological hegemony.”246  
According to Ayubi, “The juristic theory of the Islamic state… flourished 
particularly when the caliphate as an historical and political reality was weakening and 
withering.  This theory was therefore obsessed with an attempt at rescuing the community 
from its unhappy destiny by overemphasizing its presumed religious character.”247  He 
goes on to expound that “the theory of the ‘Islamic state’ is little more than elaborate fiqh 
(Islamic legal theory) presented as though it were pure shari’a.”248 
The lack of guidance for an Islamic state in the Qur’an and other Islamic texts 
weakens the camp in political Islam that believes a return to the Golden Age is required 
for Islam to succeed in government.249  More importantly, if literature and rhetoric 
divorces political Islam from the discrete objective of establishing a utopian Islamic state 
that may not be achievable, populations can view political Islam through a broader lens 
and it can act as a conduit for creating more peaceful societies.  If this is the case then any 
efforts to stifle political Islam ultimately decreases the United States’ homeland security. 
D. ISLAM, SECULARISM, AND DEMOCRACY 
Many volumes discuss the relationship between Islam and democracy in great 
detail.250  This chapter briefly examines the topics of secularism and democracy in Islam 
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to show that these two practices are not anathema to political Islam.  This illustrates a 
potential role for political Islam in Muslim and international society as an impetus for the 
establishment of democratic government without sacrificing religious beliefs and could 
contribute to a more secure America. 
According to Gudrun Krämer, Islamic belief does not constrain the method of 
governance as long as it does not violate Islamic values.251  This, coupled with an 
inherent flexibility in the shari’a, supports the broad scope of political Islam across 
widely varying governments.  The shari’a allows a role for the “elements (al-
mutaghayyir) derived by human reason from [the immutable core or al-thabit], following 
the rules of Islamic jurisprudence (ijtihad).”252  Therefore, although law must originate 
from God, Islam does not prohibit the function of man’s reason when interpreting certain 
jurisprudence.253  This leads to a bifurcated structure of Islamic legal theory. 
Islamic legal theory incorporates a structure akin to secularism by distinguishing 
between the person-creator relationship (‘ibadat) and economic, political, and familial 
relationships (mu’amalat).254  By separating these two realms, Islam allows a role for 
reason in the subject of politics while individualizing religion.  According to Abdulaziz 
Sachedina, “Islamic tradition recognizes a de facto separation between the religious and 
temporal realms of human activity.”255  Additionally, Islamic literature has also 
segregated politics from religion.  Nizam al-Mulk authored Siyasatnama (“Book of 
Politics”) in which the Muslim world categorized politics as its own discipline.256  While 
these revelations do not prescribe secularism to Islamic governance, they illustrate that 
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this structure of government does not clash with Islamic beliefs.257  The same is true with 
regards to democratic participation. 
Earliest Islam supported the concept of democracy.  One of the Prophet’s charges 
was the “appeal to give counsel (al-din al-nasiha).”258  This concept encourages 
democratic involvement and goes so far as to make political participation through 
consultation (shura) a religious duty (farida).259  Kramer equates the shura as the 
“equivalent of western parliamentary rule [and] the basis of an authentic Islamic 
democracy.”260  Islam’s tenets of shura and ‘ijma (general consensus) are two 
illustrations of the close relation between the religious practice and democracy. 
According to Sachedina, “In Islam, political and religious practices are distinct 
aspects of an historical dialectic whose aim is the establishment of a global community 
under God.”261 The consensus in moderate political Islam is that people are born equal, 
the government’s purpose is to enforce Islamic values, God is the only sovereign, the 
“source of all powers” to apply God’s law is the community, and the leader is the 
representative of the community.262  Based on this description, along with knowledge of 
Islam’s embrace of secularism and democracy, there is little reason for moderate political 
Islamists to be limited in political participation based on the fear that they do not support 
liberal principles. 
E. CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ISLAM 
In general, the U.S. perspective towards political Islam was apathetic prior to 
2001 and has become negative in the aftermath of 9/11.263  According to Gerges, there 
has been no clear policy toward it because political Islam is not considered a threat; the 
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U.S. position attempts to show respect for the religion and a rejection of extremism.264  
The United States has avoided enraging those representing political Islam, does not 
provide support for Islamist groups that oppose an ally, and has subscribed to the belief 
that political Islam is not conducive to democracy.265 
The U.S.’s myopic perspective that discredits political Islam as an engine for 
democratic reform in the Middle East and the its tendency to let short term interests 
“prevail over its commitment to liberal and democratic values” may have stifled reform 
in Muslim states and reduced homeland security.266  United States support for radical 
Islamic groups in Afghanistan during the 1980s helped these groups develop the 
capabilities showcased by militant groups at the turn of the century.  A less extreme 
example of United States short term interests overwhelming democratic ideology is the 
nation’s support for the hardline Islamic regimes of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan—neither 
of which are beacons of human rights or freedom of expression.267  The United States’ 
maintenance of the status quo in authoritarian regimes acts as a stifling force against 
democratic reform. 
1. Moderate Political Islam in Egypt 
Many Islamist groups in the 1980s and 1990s adopted a new political worldview 
when they gave up their militant stances and adopted an agenda of political action.268  
Egypt was one region of moderate political Islam where groups disavowed violence in 
the mid to late 1990s.269  The country’s “moderates believe that peaceful means and 
acceptance of democratic principles are more likely to lead to greater Islamist influence 
in Egypt.”270  Hosni Mubarak was conciliatory towards the Islamists in some cases as 
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was evidenced by him allowing Islam in law, education, and media.  According to 
Takeyh and Gvosdev, he used a strategy of placating the Muslim Brotherhood without 
recognizing the group’s legitimacy (it remained illegal) or advocating their cause.271  
This relationship worked well for the dictator; by allowing Islamists limited participation 
in a democracy that was strictly regulated by the regime, Mubarak was able to control the 
Islamists.272 
The rise of moderate political Islamists in Egypt provided the United States a 
potential source for domestic reform.  As discussed in previous chapters, the 
liberalization of Egypt could provide economic benefits to America and democratization 
might promote a more stable peace.  The Clinton Administration established contacts 
with the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1990s when it recognized the group’s viability as a 
“non-violent Islamist alternative in Egypt.”273  Ultimately, the U.S. hedged the power of 
the regime by deciding to reverse this course of action and reinforce support for 
Mubarak’s status quo (after he protested against the relations with the Muslim 
Brotherhood).  Mubarak’s power to court Washington rested on the stability his rule 
provided for American interests overseas and the continuation of the Israeli-Arab 
peace.274  However, by supporting the regime the United States elected to neglect 
potential forces of democratic reform and increased Mubarak’s power to repress these 
opposition groups.275  Mubarak’s perspective on Islamists did not include recognition of 
a difference between moderate and extremist groups and treated them with the same 
coercive means.  This prevented the rise of any effective, moderate political Islamists 
focused on enacting democratic reform.276 
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When U.S. foreign policy supports autocratic regimes such as Mubarak’s, it 
indirectly aids the government’s ability to repress opposition.  This retards reform efforts 
and delegitimizes the U.S. democratic message.277  Research indicates that pragmatic 
political Islamists that embrace pluralism, political participation, government 
accountability, and human rights have become mainstream in the 21st century.278  
According to Mandaville, contemporary Islamists are more progressive than the Arab 
regimes.279  U.S. policy supporting these regimes has helped close avenues of opposition 
for moderate political Islamists, stood in the way of democratic reform, and missed 
opportunities to foster legitimate opposition that would “expose the falsity of the 
militants’ raison d’être.”280  In the worst instances, U.S. complicity in a regime denying a 
role for moderate political Islam in government could lead some groups to resort to the 
methods of radical Islam. 
F. U.S. POLICY AND RADICALIZATION THEORY 
U.S. policy may involve personal and political ramifications that researchers have 
cited as engines for radicalization.  The Arab world’s perception that the United States 
enacts anti-Muslim policies that violate human rights and operate outside the rule of law 
reduces the legitimacy of the U.S. democratic message.  Perhaps more importantly, 
United States support for repressive regimes affects a larger population than personalized 
actions (such as extraordinary rendition) and may hasten radicalization in the most 
dramatic fashion. 
Professors Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko define radicalization as “a 
change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup 
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violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the ingroup.”281  Visually depicted, they 
present radicalization as a pyramid whose broad base represents the majority of a 
community that has shared beliefs but is not willing to use extreme measures to defend 
them.  As one moves up in the pyramid, the groups’ numbers diminish as radicalization 
increases and eventually includes more extreme measures such as terrorism.282  The 
gradient of the pyramid represents the volatility of the majority in relation to stimuli.  In 
order to complement McCauley and Moskalenko’s examination of the means by which 
individuals move up the pyramid, the specific inputs affecting that migration requires 
further scrutiny. 
Mechanisms of Radicalization 
The U.S. policy of extraordinary rendition and its support for the Mubarak regime 
are classic agents of radicalization in Egypt.  McCauley and Moskalenko identify twelve 
mechanisms that beget radicalization, ten of which are reactionary in nature.283  
Extraordinary rendition plays a role in the “Individual Radicalization by Personal 
Victimization” and may move individuals higher in the pyramid.284  In Ghost Plane, 
Stephen Grey quotes Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent Jack Cloonan as 
saying, “What we don’t seem to figure out is that when [Muslims] are abused, they are 
duty bound to get revenge.”285  Violations of human rights via kidnapping or torture 
equate to humiliation and may precipitate revenge in Arab societies.286   
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Stephen Wright quotes Ayman al-Zawahiri during his trial for the assassination of Anwar 
Sadat (and after allegedly being victimized by torture), “So where is democracy?  Where 
is freedom?  Where is [sic] human rights?  Where is justice?  Where is justice?  We will 
never forget!  We will never forget!”287 
In addition to victimization, McCauley and Moskalenko describe “Individual 
Radicalization by Political Grievance” as another reaction to external stimulus.288  
Autocratic society manifests such grievances since no political options exist for 
individuals.  America’s complicity in preventing the existence opposition groups by 
supporting the regimes that repress them runs counter to its democratic message.  
According to Maha Azzam, “It appears the main triggers of radicalization lie on the 
political level.”289  Political injustices affect a larger number of the populace and “shared 
grievances galvanize jihadis into more direct violent action against Western interests” 
based on the West’s support for autocratic regimes.290 
Those seeking to increase the gradient of the radicalization pyramid by widening 
the top can use “Jujitsu Politics,” defined as “using the enemy’s strength against him,” in 
order to augment support.291  McCauley and Moskalenko point out that “some terrorists 
have explicitly sought to elicit a state response that will carry far beyond the terrorist 
sympathizers who have not yet been mobilized.”292  Extraordinary rendition equates to a 
state response that could carry far beyond the current community of terrorists, invoking 
an outcome similar to the Jenin Paradox, and result in further radicalization.293 
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2. Themes of Islamic Radicalization 
Historical examples support McCauley and Moskalenko’s research, including the 
radicalization of Sayyid Qutb who became the “leading ideologue of the Muslim 
Brethern” and the radical Islamic movement in Egypt.294  Two elements of Qutb’s 
radicalization stand out in particular.  First, he authored his “manifesto for Islamicists” 
while interred, and reportedly tortured (radicalization by victimization), in Cairo’s Al 
Torah prison.  This prison has also held victims of extraordinary rendition.295  Secondly, 
it was Qutb’s disillusion with the West, and his belief that it lacked the values he thought 
it championed, which initially drove him toward extremism.296  This latter, and arguably 
more important, contributor is an example of radicalization by political grievance since 
he believed Western influence put humanity “on the brink of the abyss.”297  Sixty years 
later, extraordinary rendition may provide fuel for radicalization efforts similar to Qutb’s 
based on its deviation from the democratic ideals preached by the United States. 
The U.S. policy of extraordinary rendition does the most damage when it is 
coupled with U.S. support for authoritarian regimes.  A recurring theme in Muslim 
extremism is the fact that the majority believes that “Western foreign policy has been 
anti-Muslim,” especially in its support for repressive governments.298  U.S. support for 
Mubarak’s regime included providing equipment and training that could be used as 
coercive tools to repress opposition and the financial support necessary for him to 
maintain power.299  The policy of extraordinary rendition had an added benefit of 
delivering opposition members to the regime.  As CIA officer Michael Scheuer points out 
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in Jane Mayer’s The Dark Side, “It served American purposes to get these people 
arrested, and Egyptian purposes to get these people back.”300  When policies such as 
rendition transcend from acts of personal victimization to political grievances their 
negative effects are increased and, therefore, alter the shape of the radicalization pyramid. 
Increased radicalization threatens America’s security by rallying support for the 
groups seeking to delegitimize the U.S. democratic message and alienate the United 
States from a strategically important region.  Pollack describes the ploys of Arab 
autocrats, such as Mubarak, that promoted anti-U.S. messages in order to co-opt 
opposition followers and increase their own legitimacy.301  Mubarak went so far as to 
actively seek support from theological leaders, such as the ulamah of al-Azham 
University, in order to cater to Islamic opposition sympathizers.302  In addition to 
supporting the Islamic message with anti-American rhetoric, the autocratic regime’s 
repressive nature increased the strength of political Islam. 
3. Authoritarianism and Radicalization 
According to Pollack, authoritarian regimes help Islamists by eliminating secular 
opposition in order to ensure self-preservation.303  On the other hand, “although they 
certainly employed [similar] tactics against the Islamists as well… [they] also 
demonstrated a certain degree of restraint” against those groups in order to avoid earning 
an anti-religious stigma.304  As a result, individuals seeking political alternatives to the 
regime were left only with the Islamist option.305   
                                                 
300 Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on 
American Ideals (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 113.  According to Human Rights Watch, 63 renditions to 
Egypt took place between 1994 and 2004.  58 of those rendered to Egypt were Egyptian nationals.  Human 
Rights Watch, “Black Hole: The Fate of Islamists Rendered to Egypt,” May 10, 2005, E1705, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/42c3bd01d.html (accessed Sep 13, 2011). 
301 Pollack, A Path Out of the Desert, 201. 
302 Ibid, 128. 
303 Ibid., 127. 
304 Ibid.,128. 
305 Ibid., 129. 
 72 
Increasing radical Islam’s strength may lead to a higher threat of extremist actions 
against the United States and the failure of democracy in the Middle East.  According to 
McCauley and Moskalenko’s theory of “Group Radicalization in Like-Minded Groups” 
the migration of citizens to political Islam could result in a shift “toward increased 
extremity on whichever side is favored by most individuals.”306  In the worst case, if the 
Islamist group favors violent action against the United States then new members are 
likely to adopt the same stance.  If the group does not resort to terrorism, the rise of 
radical political Islam could result in the emergence of an undemocratic, anti-U.S. 
government such as Iran’s theocracy.307  While radical political Islam may provide a 
foundation for radicalization, early discussions in this chapter have showed that the 
religious pretext of Islam favors moderate government and democracy over the minority 
radical movement. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Literature describes the role of political Islam in Arab democratic reform better by 
presenting it as an overarching core of beliefs that provides architecture for varying styles 
of governance.  The moderate camp of political Islam represents an engine for reform 
that encompasses assertions of the rights of individuals based on the Qur’an.  U.S. policy 
should not support regimes that repress these groups if it desires democratic reform in the 
Middle East.  Denying moderate political Islamists access to democratic institutions is “a 
root case of violence and protest within Arab societies.”308 
The research has illustrated U.S. policy’s role in radicalization.  U.S. support for 
undemocratic regimes contributes to the Islamist belief that the only recourse is 
extremism.  Policies such as extraordinary rendition focus on the fringe elements of 
political Islam and simultaneously undermine the U.S. democratic message.  As a result, 
U.S. policy acts as an engine for radicalization. 
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McCauley and Moskalenko attribute radicalization to a “syndrome of beliefs” that 
includes a perception of injustice, distrust, and feelings of vulnerability.309  If U.S. policy 
nurtures these reactions then it is running counter to the U.S. message.  Therefore, U.S. 
policymakers should re-examine the policy of rendition and the definition of torture with 
this syndrome of beliefs in mind. 
From the U.S. policymaker’s perspective, the entrance of moderate political 
Islamists into international relations requires a paradigm shift.  Instead of focusing on 
short-term gains associated with the status quo, the United States must refocus on 
enabling long-term, sustainable stability.  Recognition of Islam’s ability to play a role in 
Middle Eastern reform and support for groups that promote human rights and democracy 
(or ending support for regimes that oppose them) delegitimizes the cause of militant 
groups and increases U.S. homeland security. 
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V. RE-EXAMINING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
A. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
The research in this thesis has illustrated that U.S. foreign policy in Egypt during 
Hosni Mubarak’s regime failed to foster any meaningful advance toward democracy.  
U.S. foreign aid, in the form of economic aid and military funding, bolstered the 
authoritarian regime.  Extraordinary rendition furthered the regime’s strength and 
compromised the integrity of the United States by jeopardizing its adherence to the rule 
of law and respect for human rights.  The continuing democratic deficit in Egypt, coupled 
with policies that do not support the U.S. cause of freedom and human rights, has 
delegitimized America’s democratic message, quelled meaningful reform, and ostracized 
political Islam.  In addition to increasing the threat of terrorism from radicalized Islamist 
groups, the actions of the past 30 years have culminated in uncertainty over the future 
trajectory of Egypt. 
Researchers must be cautious when sifting through this history in order to 
determine meaningful lessons.  U.S. foreign aid and extraordinary rendition are only two 
elements of foreign policy and this research has limited its scope to Egypt and the 
negative aspects of these U.S. policies.  Additional research must address the positive 
outcomes of U.S. foreign policy in Egypt and the other avenues of diplomacy that impact 
national security.  Despite the narrow scope of the present examination, the research 
provides support for macro-level conclusions. 
1. Short Versus Long-Term Policy 
The cases in this thesis illustrate a choice between short and long term benefits in 
foreign policy.  Short-term benefits, although they may actually persevere over a 
significant amount of time (for example, Mubarak’s 30 year rule), lack true stability that 
is backed by institutions and the rule of law.  U.S. support for Mubarak created short-
term benefits: regime stability, access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace, and peace 
with Israel.   
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The Egyptian’s ouster of Mubarak has put those benefits at risk.  Furthermore, U.S. 
policy up to the revolution has put the nation in a position opposing those seeking to 
create a more democratic Egypt. 
In order to avoid similar outcomes in the future, U.S. foreign policy must attempt 
to produce long-term benefits.  In the case of Egypt, U.S. support for the development of 
democratic institutions and law, instead of backing dictators or military leaders, will 
foster a system that governs itself and behaves as an actor that the United States can 
interact with, regardless of who holds positions of leadership.  Interestingly enough, in 
order to change the foreign policy paradigm, the United States should start by re-
examining its own methods of domestic governance. 
B. RE-EXAMINING U.S. GOVERNMENT 
All three branches of the U.S. government must play an active role in foreign 
policy.  Contemporary practice sees the executive as the main actor overseas; however, 
Congress must have a greater role in crafting foreign policy.  Additionally, the judicial 
branch plays a critical role in ensuring that policies adhere to the rule of law.310  
Adherence to this U.S. model of democracy is critical to ensuring the legitimacy of 
America’s democratic message. 
1. The Executive and Judiciary 
The events leading up to and following World War II gave rise to the 
establishment of the national security state.311  According to Thomas Mann and Norman 
Ornstein, this resulted in the demotion of Congress to the executive’s subordinate in 
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foreign policy.312  The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, a former representative in the House 
of Representatives, points out that the National Security Act of 1947 cemented the 
dominance of the executive by providing it vehicles for policy such as the National 
Security Council, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency.  As a result, 
foreign policy took on a decidedly militaristic character.313 
Recent foreign policy illustrates the faults with diplomacy that excludes the 
legislative and judicial branches.  The policy of extraordinary rendition is governed by 
executive order and lacks meaningful legislative or judicial oversight.  Lack of judicial 
branch oversight of the executive in this type of endeavor—supplanted by the Office of 
White House Counsel—undermines its duty to act as a check against foreign policy that 
may appear extralegal.  Without such checks, the government compromises a 
fundamental premise of American democracy: “the distribution of… power among its 
constituent parts.”314 
According to James Madison, “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands… may justly be pronounced the very 
definition of tyranny.”315  Currently, the executive’s ability to declare policies necessary 
(under the auspices of the Constitution) based on his own office’s legal interpretation 
undermines American democratic governance.  Congress must balance the executive’s 
power in foreign policy. 
2. Congress 
Congress was the first department that crafted foreign policy in the United States.  
prior to the Constitution, the Continental Congress carried out this duty alone since no 
executive existed.  The states’ representatives successfully governed the territory, 
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managed the Revolutionary War effort, created a relationship with France without 
capitulating to their influence, and ultimately established peace with Britain. 
Additionally, the creation of the State Department traces back to Congress’s Committee 
of Secret Correspondence.316  Therefore, Congress has a historical role in foreign policy 
that some contend makes it the preeminent branch of U.S. Government.317 
The legislative branch should share foreign policy powers with the executive.  
The Constitution is vague on this point, stating that Congress has the authority to 
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations… declare war… raise and support Armies… 
[and] provide and maintain a Navy” while it declares the executive is the commander in 
chief of the military, the office with “the Power, by and with the Consent of the Senate, to 
make Treaties,” and responsible for receiving “Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers.”318  The Federalist Papers explain this ambiguity by declaring consensus on 
the fact that, while departments must not be given a monopoly over any policy, the 
Constitution must take care not to make any department subservient to another in any 
shared capacity.319  If the executive deliberately denies the legislative branch a role in 
foreign policy then it is acting counter to the Constitution. 
There are many variables that can affect how a more prominent role for Congress 
would alter the character of U.S. foreign policy.  Would Congress have supported 
dictators for access to markets and resources?  Would it have prioritized gathering 
intelligence over guaranteeing human rights?  While thought provoking, such 
counterfactual arguments are not germane to the larger-scale impact of congressional 
involvement in foreign policy.  The U.S. concept of democracy demands that Congress 
has an equal role in foreign policy.  This sustains the institutional construct that the 
Constitution prescribed for crafting foreign policy and it helps to legitimize U.S. 
promotion of liberal democratic norms by involving the population’s representatives in 
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the foreign policy process.  In addition, having meaningful and deliberate consultation 
may help to mitigate the negative externalities associated with some foreign policy.320 
3. Current Events 
Two recent developments illustrate the executive’s continued dominance in the 
foreign policy arena.  On September 29, 2011, the Senate Appropriations Committee on 
Foreign Aid passed a measure that advocated placing conditions on U.S. military aid to 
Egypt.321  Despite the Senate measure, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton “rejected” the 
bill’s requirement to make the aid conditional.322  More than a month after Clinton’s 
remarks, the measure is absent in Congress while protests demanding democratic 
progress occur in Egypt.  Over nine months after Mubarak’s resignation, an isolated 
military leadership that has failed to repeal emergency law and improve civil liberties 
continues to govern Egypt.  The protests on November 18, 2011, included an integrated 
effort among “liberals, leftists, and Islamist parties” and were specifically targeted 
against a document the Egyptian government released that would provide military leaders 
with authority over elected officials, including parliament and the president.323  Based on 
the Secretary of State’s inability to accommodate meaningful debate with Congress over 
placing conditions on military aid to Egypt (despite the current Egyptian regime’s failure 
to show indications of reform) it appears that the executive branch continues to 
monopolize foreign policy agendas that remain inconsonant with liberal democratic 
values. 
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A second example of the executive’s dominance in American foreign policy 
concerns the policy of extraordinary rendition.  Despite President’s Obama’s 2007 
declaration that, “To build a better, freer world, we must first behave in ways that reflect 
the decency and aspirations of the American people,” he elected to continue the policy of 
extraordinary rendition after his inauguration in 2009.324  The policy’s perpetuation 
comes without any indication of increased congressional oversight or review by the 
judicial branch.325   
If extraordinary rendition continues, Congress should have oversight on the 
policy.  As representatives of the American aspirations that President Obama alluded to, 
Congress has a duty to ensure policy carried out reflects the values of U.S. citizens, 
complies with the rule of law (by included judicial review as required), and does not 
impinge on human rights.  A secretive, solitary executive (or legislature) undermines U.S. 
democratic institutions by accumulating a monopoly on power and evading judicial 
review.326 
American government’s recommitment to the democratic values outlined in the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution may not produce a significant change 
in foreign policy.  Congress, along with the President, may conclude that the ethical and 
security costs of supporting autocrats and carrying out questionable policies such as 
extraordinary rendition do not outweigh the benefits.  Judicial review may come to the 
same conclusion as the Office of White House Counsel and people such as Dick Cheney 
that “argued that the President has inherent powers under the Constitution that give him 
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power to act on his own in foreign affairs.”327  Regardless, research indicates that modern 
foreign policy’s failure to legitimately promote democracy and human rights is paralleled 
by the U.S. government’s migration away from the concept of a trifurcated democratic 
system that distributes power among the parts. 
C. RE-EXAMINING THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 
1. Evolving Foreign Policy 
Another macro-level lesson from U.S. foreign policy in Egypt is the U.S. failure 
to evolve with the international environment.  Two transformational developments 
occurred with the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the ouster of Mubarak in 2011.  
Despite the former catapulting America to the position of the world’s lone superpower, 
the United States was unable to successfully foster democratic reform in Egypt.  One 
contributor was the unchanging nature of U.S. foreign policy.  The Cold War forced 
America to court Middle East countries such as Egypt and Israel in order to counter the 
Soviet advance.  The disappearance of the communist threat changed the nature of these 
relationships in favor of the United States.  America’s benefit from providing aid to these 
nations changed significantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The United States 
failed to use the leverage the new international conditions presented to effectively 
advance the proliferation of democracy, human rights, and the stability representative 
government brings in Egypt. 
Further research may illustrate that the Gulf War in 1991 prevented any 
meaningful change in U.S. foreign policy in Egypt after the Cold War.  This would 
complement the theory that the national security state increases the accumulation of 
executive power due to a strong security apparatus.  The Iraqi threat that persevered 
through the turn of the century may have prevented Congress from taking a greater role 
in foreign policy.  Additional examination should determine if the 1991 war with Iraq and 
the decade of conflict that followed removed Congress further from the role of crafting 
and overseeing foreign policy.   
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Despite the failure to change policy after the Cold War, America has another opportunity 
to re-examine how it interacts with Egypt and other transitioning regimes. 
Egypt’s removal of Mubarak eliminates the source of short-term stability that 
U.S. policy catered to in the past 30 years.  The President and Congress must transform 
foreign aid as the international environment changes.  The Senate’s plan for conditional 
aid is a necessary measure to exert U.S. leadership and accurately convey its foreign 
policy objectives.  Congress should continue pursuing this policy in order to exercise the 
constitutional framework for foreign policy and promote the values of freedom and 
human rights abroad. 
2. Evolving Perspectives 
The end of the Cold War removed communism from its role as an ideology that 
threatened democracy.  The binary perspective of the bipolar international structure 
should not distort the post-Cold War world.  The existence of radical Islamists may 
prompt the notion that their ideology is an enemy of democracy; however, the Arab 
Spring has delegitimized this marginalized subset of political Islam.  An examination of 
moderate political Islam shows that it is not a competing ideology but rather a meta-ethic 
that shares many foundational principles of western democracy.  The political world’s 
classification of moderate political Islam as a system of beliefs upon which actors can 
create stable, democratic governments will result in sustainable systems that are propped 
up by institutions instead of men or the intervention of foreign powers.  Further research 
on moderate political Islam movements such as Turkey’s Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), Egypt’s Center Party (al-Wasat), and Tunisia’s Renaissance Party (Ennahda) 
should expand on these conclusions. 
D. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: ROOT CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 
The failure of U.S. policy in Egypt traces to its exclusion of forces for reform and 
its role in repressing these forces through support for the Mubarak regime.  However, the 
most crucial misstep of U.S. foreign policy was its delegitimization of the American 
democratic ideal.  The United States can adjust its foreign policy to support long term 
stability by placing conditions on foreign aid that require democratic reform.  
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Additionally, the United States’ recognition of political Islam’s role in democratic reform 
will work in concert with the former to proliferate freedom, respect for human rights, 
delegitimize terrorist tactics used by radical Islamists, and increase homeland security.  
Perhaps the most critical impetus behind an evolved foreign policy is the operation of the 
U.S. government in crafting such strategy. 
The United States’ foreign policy must adhere to the rule of law if it is to maintain 
legitimacy.  Violations of domestic or international law in response to terrorist attacks or 
based on economic interests may undermine the legitimacy of U.S. values and the 
nation’s liberal democratic message.  In order to adhere to the principles American 
rhetoric champions, the executive must remain subservient to the Constitution and utilize 
the legislative and judicial branches when considering national security measures. 
The U.S. Constitution does not exclude the executive from the rule of law.  This 
legal framework includes both domestic and international law since the Constitution 
specifically includes treaties—which equate to a form of international law—in its 
description of the supreme law of the land.328  Therefore, both the limits set by 
congressional legislation (or executive order) and international treaties shape the legal 
space within which the executive must operate.  Additionally, several U.S. court 
decisions support the applicability of customary international law as a part of federal 
law.329  Therefore, the President cannot take any action desired based solely on his duty 
to carry out his constitutional responsibilities; the challenge is to take the most effective 
action within the domestic and international legal framework. 
The executive must use both the judicial and legislative branches to craft foreign 
policy.  The Department of Justice fulfills the role of ensuring security policy adheres to 
domestic and international law.  Such decisions cannot rest solely with the Office of 
White House Counsel; they must take place outside the executive branch to ensure 
subjectivity.  Mechanisms, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act courts, exist 
to provide time critical decisions on the legality of surveillance in terrorism cases.  A 
                                                 
328 U.S. Constitution, art. 6, cl. 2. 
329 See Christopher Linde, “The US. Constitution and International Law: Finding the Balance,” 
Journal of Transnational Law & Policy Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring 2006), 305-339. 
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similar process could provide expedited Department of Justice rulings on other security 
actions the executive is considering in order to ensure compliance with the rule of law.  
In this capacity, the judicial branch acts as a pre-emptive legal check against the 
executive’s actions.  Congress, on the other hand, provides the balance to foreign policy. 
The executive and legislative branches share the responsibility for foreign 
policy.330  Two of Congress’s most visible roles in foreign policy are ratifying treaties 
and authorizing military action.  The legislative branch’s role in security decisions is to 
provide the executive an additional source of legal expertise and constitutional legitimacy 
(i.e. congressional approval of military action).  Furthermore, legislative branch 
participation in security measures improves its function of executive oversight and may 
mitigate investigative efforts through inter-branch transparency.  Ultimately, the 
President’s consultation with Congress acts as a valuable tool for his own protection. 
U.S. foreign policy has led to many positive outcomes in multiple regions.  
However, sometimes these policies have contradictory outcomes.  Policymakers benefit 
from greater collaboration and expertise when attempting to avoid negative externalities 
of foreign policy such as radicalization, terrorism, and the delegitimization of democracy.  
The first step in preventing future detours from the democratic course in America’s 
international agenda is to re-engage the constitutional framework that calls for 
coordinated foreign policy that includes all three branches of the U.S. federal 
government. 
                                                 
330 Harold Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 4. 
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